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ABSTRACT 
While Shia organizations, such as Hezbollah, pioneered the use of suicide bombings as 
“self-sacrifice operations” in the early 1980s, Shia groups have abandoned the practice 
since the 1990s, while Sunni organizations like Hamas and Al Qaeda in Iraq have not 
only exponentially increased the use of “martyrdom operations,” they have expanded the 
target set to include civilians and now primarily target other Muslims.  By first analyzing 
the historical tradition of martyrdom within Shia and Sunni Islam and then conducting 
case studies on Shia Hezbollah, Sunni Hamas and Sunni Al Qaeda in Iraq, this thesis 
seeks to discover whether there are historical factors that can help explain the differences 
in the contemporary expression of martyrdom between the two main sects of Islam.  The 
main findings of this thesis are that the less prominent role martyrs play in the Sunni 
tradition, contrasted against the consistent 1,400-year history of venerating prominent 
Shia martyrs, allowed Sunni extremists to essentially rewrite their history and reinvent 
“martyrdom” to suit their own contemporary political goals.  Additionally, the research 
reveals that in the vacuum of restraint from the Sunni theologians, Sunni Salafi-Jihadist 
organizations like Al Qaeda have pushed the boundaries of the religious justification that 
supports martyrdom operations so far that they are now primarily killing Muslims and 
non-combatants – a practice that is not only forbidden, but one of the greatest sins in 
Islam.   
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I. MARTYRDOM IN ISLAM  
The martyr can be compared to a candle whose job it is to burn out and 
get extinguished in order to shed light for the benefit of others. The 
martyrs are the candles of society. Had they not shed their light on the 
darkness of despotism and suppression, humanity would have made no 
progress. – Murtada Mutahhari 
 
A. THE PHENOMENOM OF SUICIDE BOMBINGS 
The disturbing phenomenon of suicide bombings has now firmly taken hold in the 
Muslim psyche as a form of martyrdom.  Whether it was the thousands of young Iranian 
boys in the Bassidj organization who sacrificed themselves during the Iran-Iraq war in 
the 1980s, the Shia militants in Islamic Jihad that bombed the U.S. embassy and French 
barracks in Beirut in 1983, the Hezbollah attacks against Israeli targets in southern 
Lebanon in the 1980s, the 9/11 hijackers flying commercial airliners into the World 
Trade Center, or during the last five years frequent reports of suicide bombings in Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, Muslims across the world are committing suicide to attack 
their perceived enemy and become martyrs for their cause.  While most Americans are 
familiar with the U.S. embassy and Marine barracks bombing in Lebanon in 1983 by the 
Shia group Islamic Jihad, the first major suicide terrorist attack actually committed in the 
Middle East in contemporary history was the destruction of the Iraq embassy in Beirut in 
December 1981, which killed 27 and injured over 100.  The Iraqi embassy bombing was 
committed by the Islamic Dawa party, a Shia group from Iraq that relocated to Iran in 
1979.  It is also widely known how Hezbollah embraced the tactic, and used suicide 
attacks throughout the 1980s against Israeli targets, but inexplicably stopped the practice 
before the end of the decade.  Whether it was the loss of effectiveness, the pull back in 
justification by leading Shia scholars, or because the goal of Israel’s withdrawal from 
Lebanon had been achieved is up for debate and will be discussed further, but the 
important thing to note is that there have been no confirmed suicide bombings committed 
by a Shia organization since 1994, even during the 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon.  
This cessation among Shia groups is in stark contrast to the great expansion in the 
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number, consistency, and theaters of operation where suicide bombings have been 
committed by Sunni organizations since the early 1990s.  This trend originated with 
Hamas and PIJ in 1993 during the Oslo Peace Process, but has been adopted by Sunni 
global jihadist groups like Al Qaeda and its affiliates, who are continuing to send suicide 
bombers to their destruction and promised destiny in “martyrdom operations.”     
What can account for the great discrepancy between the use of suicide bombings 
by Shia and Sunni organizations since 1994 is the main question this thesis seeks to 
answer.  In searching for this overarching answer, many other questions will also be 
explored.  Is there something inherently different in how the two major sects of Islam 
view martyrdom, historically, that has explanatory value for the difference we see in 
employment now?  How and why did the concept of martyrdom develop differently 
between Shia and Sunni Islam?  Why did Shia organizations, who pioneered the use of 
“self-sacrifice” operations beginning in 1981, almost completely cease using the tactic 
before the end of the decade?  Why were the Sunni organizations, who began using 
martyrdom operations in the early 1990s, so much less restrained in their targeting than 
their Shia predecessors?  What can explain the dramatic rise in the number of suicide 
attacks committed in the Occupied Territories by Sunni organizations like Hamas from 
the First to the Second Intifada?  What can explain the veritable explosion in the 
frequency of suicide violence by Sunni Salafi-Jihadist organizations like Al Qaeda since 
2000, especially by Al Qaeda in Iraq?  Finally, what role did the Shia and Sunni ulama 
(religious scholars) play in the development, spread, and employment of martyrdom 
operations throughout the Muslim world?         
Suicide attacks, specifically, are important to study versus other forms of 
extremist violence because of the difficulty in defending against them, their lethality, and 
their potential for damage on a grand scale.  One researcher found that while suicide 
attacks account for only 5 percent of all terrorist attacks, they are responsible for roughly 
half of all casualties.1  Additionally, suicide attacks have shown that they can alter events 
on the world stage.  Whether it was Hezbollah convincing the U.S. and France to 
                                                 
1  Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random 
House, 2005), 6. 
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withdraw their peacekeeping forces from Lebanon or Israel to withdraw from Southern 
Lebanon, or Al Qaeda igniting the Global War on Terrorism with their 9/11 attacks, 
suicide attacks can not only lead to great loss of life and damage to infrastructure, but can 
affect the course of human history.   
A necessary first step is to establish the definition of martyrdom operations, 
which normally take the form of a suicide bomber.  There is a key difference between 
suicide operations and those that can be described as “suicidal.” Any high risk operation, 
or when the attacker/defender continues despite knowing that the end result is his likely 
death, can be described as suicidal.  These suicidal operations often generate martyrs 
since, despite the odds, individuals made the ultimate sacrifice and never stopped fighting 
for their cause.  For suicide bombers, however, the death of the attacker is a necessary 
part of the attack.  For this thesis, I will use M. Hafez’s definition of a suicide bomber as 
“an individual who willingly uses his or her body to carry or deliver explosives or 
explosive materials to attack, kill or maim others.”2  With a typical “martyrdom 
operation” defined, further analysis is possible. 
B. EXISTING LITERATURE 
The shear breadth and destructiveness of suicide bombing, and specifically its 
strong association with Islam, generates many questions worth studying.  To date, whole 
libraries full of literature have been written trying to understand and explain suicide 
attacks.  Broadly speaking, the scholarship on the subject can be broken into cultural, 
rational, and psychological approaches. Amongst the cultural school of thought is the 
argument that suicide bombing is merely religious fanaticism, citing religious figures that 
influence followers with promises of rewards in heaven.  These charismatic leaders will 
selectively find and twist passages from the Quran and religious texts to suit their goals, 
framing suicide attacks as a way to execute God’s will.  This argument seems to be 
supported by many of the recent suicide bombers in Israel, Iraq, Chechnya, Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, and Al Qaeda terrorists worldwide, as many of these bombers will use 
                                                 
2 Mohammed M. Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers 
(Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006), 4. 
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religious passages to justify their actions as jihad and martyrdom.3  However, this is a 
somewhat limited view that does not take into account the full range of factors that 
contribute to the phenomenon of suicide bombing, nor can it account for the large 
number of suicide attacks committed by secular groups such as the Sri Lankan Tamil 
Tigers, the PKK in Turkey, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades or the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine.  Examples of literature that espouse suicide bombings as 
religious fanaticism can be found in the works of Harvey W. Kushner and Raphael 
Israeli.4 
Rationalist theories argue that there is tactical or strategic logic to suicide 
bombings and, therefore, they are the work of rational actors.  Ehud Sprinzak and Scott 
Atran highlight the tactical logic of using suicide bombers as “smart bombs” that are 
highly accurate, versatile, able to hit difficult target sets, and can make operational 
adjustments during an attack.5  Additionally, suicide bombers are less likely to be 
captured and able to inform on the organization.  By using a single individual, economy 
of force saves an organization from losing multiple members for a single attack.  
However, suicide attacks are also frequently used in bombings against soft targets where 
a smart bomb is not required, and the loss of a dedicated member of the organization does 
not seem warranted.  These two examples highlight where there is a failure of tactical 
logic in conducting a suicide bombing.           
Robert Pape argues that not only is suicide terrorism strategically logical, but that 
it is particularly effective against democracies that may be sensitive to high casualty 
rates.6  Pape also contends that suicide attacks signal a population about the high level of 
commitment of an organization, delivering the message that it cannot be deterred.  The 
                                                 
3  Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers. 
4  Harvey W. Kushner, "Suicide Bombers: Business as Usual," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 19, 
no. 4 (1996), 329–337.  Raphael Israeli, Islamikaze: Manifestations of Islamic Martyrology (Portland, OR: 
Frank Cass, 2003).   
5  Ehud Sprinzak, "Rational Fanatics," Foreign Policy, no. 120 (Sep.–Oct. 2000), 66–73.  Scott Atran, 
"Genesis of Suicide Terrorism," Science 299, no. 5612 (7 Mar. 2003), 1534–1539. 
6  Robert A. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," The American Political Science Review 
97, no. 3 (Aug. 2003), 343–361. 
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devastatingly successful suicide attacks against U.S. and French targets in Lebanon in 
1983 that caused the multinational forces to withdraw from Lebanon form the basis of his 
theory, and he expands his study to include the suicide campaigns carried out since, 
including the Second Intifada.  Unfortunately, Pape’s strategic logic begins to break 
down when analyzing suicide terror campaigns that are not targeting democracies, such 
as the extended campaign Al Qaeda in Iraq has waged since 2003.  In trying to apply his 
theory there, it is not clear exactly who the target democracy is in Iraq, nor who is 
supposed to be receiving what signal.     
The notion of signaling is expanded upon in work by Mia Bloom. She also 
focuses on the efforts of Palestinian organizations during the Second Intifada to increase 
their popularity and “market share” amongst their constituencies by “outbidding” their 
rivals.7 However, Bloom’s theory may only hold explanatory value in situations where 
the constituent audience is highly supportive of suicide bombings as was the case 
amongst the Palestinians during the Second Intifada. Additionally, while her theory may 
attempt to explain the organizational motives, it does little to explain why there was such 
a huge increase in public support for suicide bombings in Palestine, a necessary precursor 
for her theory to apply; organizations cannot increase their patronage and influence by 
engaging in activities that are unpopular with their target audience.          
One shortcoming of all these rational actor approaches is that they tend to focus 
on the actions of the organization, at the expense of understanding the motivations of the 
suicide bombers themselves.  In the case of the Palestinian suicide bombers, statements 
from the bombers indicate a mixture of religious and national inspiration, not tactical or 
strategic considerations.8  Also, if suicide bombing is obviously rational, why do 
organizations exert so much effort generating martyrdom mythologies to venerate their 
“heroes” to justify and explain their actions to their target populations?  Additionally, the 
logic of individual motivations is difficult to understand, as the suicide bomber is 
necessarily dead, and unable to enjoy any benefits from their actions, at least in this life.  
                                                 
7  Mia M. Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding," 
Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 1 (Spring 2004), 61–88. 
8  Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers, 14. 
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At the point individual motivations are understood as a product of rewards sought either 
for themselves or loved ones in the afterlife, strategic and tactical logic becomes 
immersed in religious explanations.      
The case for suicide bombing as a result of psychological trauma and societal 
repression is made by individuals such as Eyad El-Sarraj.  As a psychologist in Palestine, 
El-Sarraj drew on first-hand knowledge gleaned from interviews of aspiring martyrs and 
surviving family members in formulating his theories.  He contends that, at least in the 
case of the Palestinians during the Second Intifada, Palestinian youth were acclimated to 
violence by growing up during the First Intifada, and motivated to commit violence by 
the shock of watching their parents and loved ones humiliated by Israeli Defense Forces.9  
The lack of hope in achieving any dignity for their people has led to a general state of 
despair amongst the Palestinian population, which can be ameliorated at least at the 
individual level by achieving the status of a venerated martyr.  While useful in helping 
one to understand individual motives of that particular terrorism campaign, psychological 
explanations are not sufficient to understand why suicide bombings have only recently 
developed as a phenomenon, and only in certain locales.  Oppression and violence have 
been around for all of recorded human history.  As opposed to the rational actor theories, 
psychological explanations focus on explaining individual motives, but are lacking in 
explanatory value when applied to the calculations of organizations.           
In addition to the broad categories of cultural, rational and psychological are 
approaches that blend different theories together and comprehensively analyze the 
phenomenon on different levels: organizational strategies, individual motivations, and 
societal conflicts.  Assaf Moghadam and Mohammed Hafez have written extensively 
applying their more complex theoretical models, which even include social movement 
theory, to both the Palestinian suicide bombers, and more recently the suicide bombers in 
Iraq.  These authors delve into how organizations that commit suicide bombings have 
successfully mobilized target populations, how organizations during the Second Intifada 
successfully framed suicide bombing as “martyrdom operations,” and how that 
                                                 
9  Eyad El Sarraj and Linda Butler, "Suicide Bombers: Dignity, Despair, and the Need for Hope: An 
Interview with Eyad El Sarraj," Journal of Palestine Studies 31, no. 4 (Summer 2002), 71–76. 
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methodology has been copied and even enhanced by other extremist organizations.10 
These theories make a point of drawing distinctions between different societal conflicts, 
understanding that different structural, cultural and strategic factors come into play based 
on situational realities. 
To gain a greater understanding of cultural factors pertaining to martyrdom in 
Islam, the speeches and lectures by Dr. Ali Shari’ati, Ayatullah Murtada Mutahhari, and 
Ayatullah Mahmud Taleqani are instrumental in understanding the basic concepts, 
especially the long tradition of venerating martyrs in Shia Islam.  These three Shia 
scholars were not only instrumental in modernizing the concept of jihad amongst Shia 
Islam in the 20th Century, the case can be made that they provided the modern foundation 
for the legal justifications for martyrdom operations currently used by both Shia and 
Sunni extremists.11 However, while their work is instrumental in understanding the basic 
premise of how jihad and martyrdom is viewed in Islam, and how that view was 
modernized and helped inspire the Islamic Revolution in Iran, because their speeches and 
lectures predate the development of suicide bombings as “martyrdom operations,” and 
especially because they are all Shia scholars, additional research is needed to properly 
gauge their contribution to the present phenomenon of suicide bombings, especially 
amongst Sunni organizations.         
An example of scholarship that tries to link the historical traditions within Shia 
and Sunni Islam to modern day suicide bombings has been published by David Cook and 
Bernard Freamon.  Cook highlights how in Sunni Islam, most martyrs were participants 
in jihad or sectarian warfare, in contrast to Shia martyrs who were normally the victims 
of Sunni Muslims.  Cook also asserts that the relatively recent development of martyrdom 
operations was aided by the approval of the ulama trying to reassert their authority as 
radical Islam became more popular, although most establishment ulama tried to limit the 
application of the practice, usually to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Radical Islamists 
                                                 
10  Assaf Moghadam, "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and 
Organizational Aspects," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26, no. 2 (Mar./Apr. 2003), 65;  Hafez, 
Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers. 
11  Mehdi Abedi and Gary Legenhausen, eds., Jihad and Shahadat: Struggle and Martyrdom in Islam, 
(North Haledon, NJ: Islamic Publications International, 1986). 
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have continually tried to broaden the scope when martyrdom operations may be 
employed, to the point where global jihadist organizations are killing women, children, 
non-combatants and Muslims.12   
Bernard Freamon agrees with David Cook that suicide violence is only weakly 
supported by classical sources of Islamic law and jurisprudence.  However, he contends 
that the current justifications for martyrdom operations can mostly be attributed to a 
major reinterpretation of religious law and military jihad by Shiite theologians and jurists 
in Iraq and Iran during the 1960s and 1970s.  He goes on to show the connections 
illustrating how Sunni extremists such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian 
territories first appropriated the Shiite reinterpretations, and then expanded their 
justifications to fit their organizational goals.13                    
This thesis, however, will take the approach of first comparing the historical 
martyrdom narrative between the Shia and Sunni traditions of Islam and identifying both 
material and theological differences.  This paper will also explore the difference in the 
relationship between the religious scholars and the Islamic community amongst the Shia 
and Sunni traditions, and how the differences in organized hierarchy and prestige of the 
Shia scholars affect the general acceptance of religious edicts versus Sunni ulama. Once 
these differences are identified, we will see how they hold explanatory value for 
discrepancies observed in the way Shia and Sunni extremist groups have conducted 
martyrdom operations in recent history, specifically why Shia groups were more 
restrained in their targeting, and why there have been no suicide bombing attacks by Shia 
organizations since 1994.  This is in direct contrast to the Sunni examples of suicide 
bombings that began in the First Intifada in the occupied territories, exploded in scale and 
frequency during the Second Intifada, and continued to this day in places like Iraq and 
Pakistan.  
                                                 
12  David Cook, "Comparative Martyrdom in the Sunni and Shi'ite Traditions" Suicide Terrorism 
Project, (20 August 2007). 
13  Bernard K. Freamon, "Martyrdom, Suicide, and the Islamic Law of War: A Short Legal History," 
Fordham International Law Journal 299, no. 27 (2004), 299–369. 
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I argue that the less prominent role martyrs play in the Sunni tradition, contrasted 
against the consistent 1,400-year history of venerating prominent Shia martyrs, allowed 
Sunni extremists to essentially rewrite their history and reinvent “martyrdom” to suit their 
own contemporary political goals.  This can be seen in the stark contrast of modern 
mythology between Sunni and Shia martyrs that is reflected in the literature published by 
Sunni extremist groups.  I further contend that the less organized and hierarchal Sunni 
religious scholars, while they initially let the door open condoning suicide bombings 
against Israelis, have been unable and/or unwilling to rein in the practice with the 
issuance of strong religious decrees like the Shia scholars did in the 1990s.  The inability 
and unwillingness of the Sunni ulama (religious scholars) stems from their less prominent 
position in the Sunni population compared to the Shia, and the desire to not lose any 
more respect in the face of growing Islamic revivalism.  Finally, I argue that in the 
vacuum of restraint from the Sunni theologians, Sunni global jihadist organizations like 
Al Qaeda have pushed the boundaries of the religious justification for martyrdom 
operations so far that they are now primarily killing Muslims and non-combatants, which 
is not only haram (forbidden), but one of the greatest sins in Islam. 
To analyze the historical difference regarding martyrdom between the two 
traditions, this thesis reviewed the development of martyrdom mythology beginning from 
the time of the Prophet Muhammad up to the Sunni and Shia revivals and renaissance in 
the 20th century.  To answer the question of whether differing historical narratives affect 
contemporary expression, this paper utilized three case studies: the Shia organization 
Hezbollah in the 1980s, the Sunni Hamas during the Second Intifada, and the ongoing 
suicide bombing campaign in Iraq, mostly perpetrated by the Sunni organization Al 
Qaeda in Iraq. Specifically I looked for how the organizations interpreted the classical 
literature, and when they utilized more modern interpretations by contemporary scholars.   
Throughout the thesis, you will see how the differences in historical perceptions 
of martyrdom not only influenced the modern renaissance in Sunni and Shia Islam, but 
how this historical difference enabled suicide bombings to first appear amongst Shia 
organizations, and consequently why the Shia interpretation led to the abandonment of 
the practice.  It will also become apparent that without a history of veneration of martyrs, 
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and with a disorganized and fractured ulama, Sunni organizations were provided a 
veritable tabula rasa with which to invent their own martyrdom mythology to justify 
martyrdom operations, conducted in pursuit of their contemporary political objectives.    
 11
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF MARTYRDOM IN ISLAM 
In all ages and centuries, when the followers of a faith and an idea have 
power, they guarantee their honor and lives with jihad. But when they are 
weakened and have no means whereby to struggle, they guarantee their 
lives, movement, faith, respect, honor, future and history with shahadat.  
Shahadat is an invitation to all generations, in all ages, if you cannot kill 
your oppressor, then die. – Ali Shari’ati 
 
Historically, martyrs can be viewed as the ultimate example of the belief system 
for which they were willing to die.  Usually, this belief system is in a minority position, 
or under attack from a more culturally or politically dominant position in their region.  
The path to martyrdom will typically include a series of events: suffering by the martyr, 
the obviously unjust nature of the enemy, a final expression of defiance and, ultimately, 
his or her death.14  However, a martyr that falls alone in the woods does not make a 
sound; there must be an audience to receive the message.  The audience does not have to 
be present at the martyr’s death, but someone must take on the role of a narrator to 
transmit the story to a wider audience.  In order for the story to take root and grow, there 
should be a clear evil to fertilize the outrage of the audience.  If the message is 
compelling enough, and there was a group of people that stood off to the side and did 
nothing to stop the unjust suffering and killing, they can potentially be motivated by guilt 
to mobilize and join the cause of the martyr.15   
In a broader sense, martyrdom is used to establish some type of meaning and 
dignity in death.  Stories of martyrs help assuage the fear that arises from the certainty 
that everyone will eventually die, but the uncertainty of when or how that may happen.  A 
martyr does not seek to avoid death, but instead take control of his fate, and give his life 
for a cause worth dying for.  Once the martyr’s story is captured in the imaginations of 
others, death becomes a little less scary for those that subscribe to the martyrology.      
                                                 
14  David Cook, Martyrdom in Islam (Cambrige, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 2–3 
15  Ibid., 3. 
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For Christians, Jesus Christ exemplifies these classical elements of martyrdom.  
The tales of his suffering before his arrest in the Garden of Gethsemane, his ordeal 
dragging his cross to the mount while being victimized by the soldiers, and finally the 
pain of his crucifixion are legendary.  The obviously unjust sentence pursued by his evil 
prosecutors, and the capitulation of Pontius Pilate to a sentence he did not agree with in 
order to satisfy the pressure of the crowds, further enhance the martyrdom narrative.  The 
fact that Jesus continued to forgive his persecutors as a form of defiance, and stoically 
refrained from responding to the insults hurled at him up until his death strengthen the 
case for his martyrdom.  Finally, his death is given cosmic significance in the Gospels, as 
darkness covers the land and the curtain of the Temple is torn.  After the conversion of 
the Roman Empire to Christianity, martyrologies became a popular teaching tool and 
spread throughout the empire.  After the Muslim conquest of a large portion of the 
Roman Empire, much of this material was absorbed by Islam and preserved in religious 
literature.16   
One of the difficulties of studying martyrdom in Islam is that there is no 
agreement on when the holy Quran actually uses the term martyr.  This is because the 
word for witness and martyr both come from the Arabic root sha-ha-da, and the actual 
word, shu-ha-da’, means both witness and martyr, depending on the context.  In the 
Quran, after the defeat of the Muslims at the Battle of Uhud, in verses 3:138–43, we see 
perhaps when the definition of shuhada’ takes on the meaning of martyr instead of 
witness: 
This [Quran] is a clear statement to [all] the people and a guidance and 
instruction for those conscious of Allah.  So do not weaken and do not 
grieve, and you will be superior if you are [true] believers.  If a wound 
should touch you – there has already touched the [opposing] people a 
wound similar to it.  And these days [of varying conditions] We alternate 
among the people so that Allah may make evident those who believe an 
[may] take to Himself from among you martyrs – and Allah does not like 
the wrong doers – And that Allah may purify the believers [through trials] 
and destroy the disbelievers.  Or do you think that you will enter Paradise 
while Allah has not yet made evident those of you who fight in His cause  
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and made evident those who are steadfast?  And you had certainly wished 
for martyrdom before you encountered it, and you have [now] seen it 
[before you] while you were looking on.  
Here the close proximity of fighting for Allah’s cause and yearning for death makes it 
clear the Quran is no longer referring to just a witness, and that shuhada’ now means 
Allah will take martyrs to himself.  Most scholars agree that the interpretive leap from 
witness to martyr in the Quran is made because martyrdom is considered the ultimate 
“witness testimony” proclaiming the martyr’s faith in God, one all Muslims should 
celebrate and seek to emulate.17       
The most well known Quranic verse associated with martyrdom, however, and the 
one found on most martyrs’ gravesites, is also from the Battle of Uhud, 3:169–70: 
And never think of those who have been killed in the cause of Allah as 
dead.  Rather, they are alive with their Lord, receiving provision, rejoicing 
in what Allah has bestowed upon them of His bounty, and they receive 
good tidings about those [to be martyred] after them who have not yet 
joined them – that there will be no fear concerning them, nor will they 
grieve.  
The Arabic word shahid does not actually appear in the latter verse, nor do the rewards 
offered differ from those provided for all righteous Muslims.18  There are numerous 
Quranic verses that are considered to venerate the category of martyr—2:154, 2:207, 
2:216, 3:169, 4:69, 4:74, 4:95-96, 9:11, and 9:20–22—however, it is important to note 
that of those verses, only one, 4:69, actually uses the term martyr:  
And whoever obeys Allah and the Messenger – those will be with the ones 
upon whom Allah has bestowed favor of the prophets, the steadfast 
affirmers of truth, the martyrs and the righteous.  And excellent are those 
as companions.   
The scarcity of specific references to martyrdom in the Quran highlights that the lore 
surrounding martyrdom stems mostly from the hadiths (prophetic traditions).  This lore 
develops and substantially changes over time with the tales of prominent Muslims who 
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are martyred for righteous causes.  The ideal Muslim martyr in the classical sense could 
be described as a man who fearlessly sought out a violent situation with pure intentions to 
“lift the Word of Allah to the highest” in his pursuit of jihad.  While Muslim 
martyrologies do not focus on the extended suffering endured during the process of 
dying, like Christian examples, the Muslim martyr did have to have a final utterance of 
defiance, a piece of wisdom, perhaps even a prayer or a poem, that would act as his 
lasting contribution to Islam.19 This requirement for a final communication has lasted 
through the centuries and is present in the last will statements of suicide bombers that 
will be discussed later.    
 The fact that martyrdom developed and changed over the centuries is a reflection 
of the change in Muslim society.  Classical Islamic doctrine teaches that Muslims are 
allowed, even obligated, to go to war to defend their religion, the community, and the 
Dar al-Islam (abode of Islam or Peace).20  During the expansion of the Caliphate from 
successful Muslim conquests, Muslim society was more war-like and, therefore, the 
opportunities for attaining martyrdom were almost exclusively on the battlefield.  Even in 
the early times of Muslim expansion, however, there was the creation of a secondary 
class of martyr.  One explanation was that early leaders sought to temper the fanatical 
rush to martyrdom sought on the battlefield, which often ran contrary to good military 
tactics.  The breaking of ranks to rush for martyrdom seems to even be discouraged in the 
Quran in 61:4, “Allah loves those who fight in His cause arrayed in battle, as though they 
were a compact structure.” Some scholars argued that since jihad is supposed to be a 
group activity where individuals are anonymous, individual attacks should not be 
allowed.  The rationalist Mu’tazilite theologians of the eighth through the tenth centuries 
were not convinced that an individual should even seek martyrdom.21 
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The Prophet himself taught that piety and diligence in everyday life could yield 
the same rewards as battlefield heroics.22  This particular message of the Prophet 
resonated louder as Muslim society changed over time.  However, as Muslim society 
became less warlike, the methods of attaining martyrdom continued to expand, to include 
even accidental deaths.   The qualifications were diluted so much so that martyrdom lost 
all of its special meaning and could apply to almost anyone by the medieval period.   
Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti (d. 1505) collected most of the expanded traditions for 
martyrdom into one book, The Gates of Happiness Concerning the Circumstances of 
Martyrdom. In his book, Suyuti cites a popular tradition expanding the qualifications of a 
martyr:  
There are seven categories of martyr other than being killed in the path of 
Allah.  The one who dies of a stomach complaint is a martyr, the one who 
drowns is a martyr, the one who dies of plague is a martyr, the one who 
dies in a structural collapse is a martyr, the one who dies in a fire is a 
martyr, the one who dies of pleurisy, and the woman who dies in 
childbirth is a martyr.23  
Through the early nineteenth century, the list continued to expand.  Jaffur Shurreef 
provides a very liberal list of qualifications in his 1832 work, Qanoon-E-Islam: 
1) If a man expire[s] in the act of reading the Quran; 2) if in the act of 
praying; 3) if in the act of fasting; 4) if on the pilgrimage to Mecca; if on a 
Friday…; 6) if in the defense of his religion; 7) if through religious 
meditation; 8) if he be executed for speaking the truth; 9) if he endure[s] 
death by the hands of tyrant oppressor with patience and submission; 10) 
if killed in defending his won property; 11) if a woman die[s] in labour or 
child-bed; 12) if murdered by robber; 13) if devoured by tigers; 14) if 
killed by the kick of a horse; 15) if struck dead by lightning; 16) if burnt to 
death; 17) if buried under the ruins of a wall; 18) if drowned; 19) if killed 
by a fall from a precipice, or down a dry well or pit; 20) if he meet[s] 
death by apoplexy, or a stroke of the sun.  
Another explanation for this dilution in the requirements is that the doctrine of 
martyrdom was shaped by the religious scholars, who could tolerate the rule of a tyrant, 
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but were opposed to the anarchy represented by early Islamic rebels.  Another possible 
contributing factor was the pervasive influence of Sufi mysticism, with its prioritization 
of the spiritual experience versus physical martyrdom.24  The Sufi apologist Abu Hamid 
Muhammad al-Ghazali (1058–1111) stated that “everyone who gives himself wholly to 
God…in the war against his own desires is a martyr when he meets death going forward 
without turning his back.”25 This Sufi sentiment echoes the teaching of the Quran that 
there are in fact two different kinds of jihad, the peaceful form of a “struggle” against the 
inner evil tendencies found in everyone, which is sometimes referred to as the “greater 
jihad,” versus the outward form in the jihad of the sword, which is referred to as the 
“smaller jihad.”26 Regardless of all the reasons, by the nineteenth century it is obvious 
that the Muslim concept of martyrdom had strayed significantly from the original 
teachings of the Messenger of Allah, and was ripe for a reinterpretation and revival.  It is 
also important to note that it is impossible for anyone other than God to designate a 
martyr, since only he can know exactly what was in an individual’s heart and mind when 
they died.  This restriction is expressed by the conditional statements when naming 
martyrs, but these conditional statements are largely irrelevant, since the heroic dead 
individuals are venerated by the Muslim community as if God had accepted them as 
martyrs.  
To this point, we have covered the expanding qualifications of martyrdom, but it 
is important to note why it was so sought after to achieve the status of martyr.  In one 
hadith, the Prophet Muhammad is credited with saying “no slave [of God] who dies and 
has goodness with God wants to return to the world, even if he would have the world and 
all that is in it, except the martyr, for when he sees the greatness of martyrdom, he will 
want to return to the world and be killed again.”  Other benefits of martyrdom listed in 
the prophetic traditions include remission of one’s sins at the first opportunity, immediate 
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admission into heaven avoiding the torment of the grave and the great fright [of the 
Resurrection], the privilege of accompanying prophets, marriage to beautiful heavenly 
maidens (houris), a crown with priceless rubies, the right to intercede with God on 
judgment day on behalf of seventy relatives, protection against the pain of death, and 
entry into the highest gardens of heaven.27 In the Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali tradition, 
the martyr’s body is not even prayed over—there is no need because he has already been 
welcomed into paradise.        
With amazing benefits such as these ascribed to martyrs, the motivations for truly 
religious Muslims to attain martyrdom are understandable.   While discussing the hadiths 
though, it is important to note that many prophetic traditions strictly prohibit the killing 
of civilians, defined by the Prophet Muhammad as servants, women, children or the 
elderly.  Rudolph Peters even notes that “all [Islamic jurisprudence] schools agree that 
minors and women may not be killed, unless they actually fight against the Moslems.”28  
The Quran itself specifically forbids the killing of other Muslims in verse 4:93, “If a man 
kills a believer intentionally, his recompense is Hell, to abide therein (forever): And the 
wrath and the curse of Allah are upon him, and a dreadful penalty is prepared for him.”  
A number of traditions even state that when one Muslim kills another, both will go to 
hell.  This poses a particular and still unresolved problem for Sunni Islam, which 
venerates most of the early companions who were actually killed by other Muslims.29  
The strict restrictions on who cannot be killed in battle should also cause a problem for 
Muslims in contemporary times who believe they will become a martyr by killing 
members of the protected groups.  This dichotomy between what the religious texts state, 
and the killing of Muslims, innocents, and civilians by Muslim suicide bombers will be 
discussed further in later sections.    
Muslims draw an important distinction between their martyrs and those of other 
religions and cultures who traditionally view them as heroes killed in battle with the 
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enemy.  The fighting martyr is unique to Islam, because Jesus and Buddha were not 
violent, as opposed to Muhammad who took up arms as a military leader, and is believed 
to have encouraged seeking a righteous death in battle, as recorded in many hadiths.  The 
act of a believer actively seeking martyrdom became a theme in the faith, different from 
the other great missionary religions where their deaths are considered an accident, 
typically marked by great sorrow and misery.  Muslims, however, do not consider 
martyrdom a death imposed by an enemy upon their warriors, but instead it is a death 
desired, “selected with all of the awareness, logic, reasoning, intelligence, understanding, 
consciousness and alertness that a human being can have.”30  Unfortunately, the debate 
over where the line is between committing suicide and achieving martyrdom by 
intentionally dying for your cause has never been adequately delineated.  The Sufi 
scholar al-Ghazali (d. 1111) seems to have extended the boundaries when he wrote that it 
is acceptable for one to intentionally take action that leads to his own certain death, as 
long as he has the intention of creating terror in the hearts of the enemy.  Other scholars 
took a similar position, requiring only that such actions be beneficial to Muslims in 
general.31   
This distinction from Buddhist and Christian martyrs, along with the ambiguity of 
what exactly constitutes suicide in Islam, helps to explain why the vast majority of 
contemporary suicide bombings are carried out by Muslims—suicide bombings have 
been successfully recast as martyrdom operations in the last half century.  In order to 
discover whether there is historical basis for the differences in contemporary expression 
amongst Shia and Sunni populations, it is necessary to analyze more in depth the 
differing histories of martyrdom in the Shia and Sunni Islamic traditions.     
A. HISTORICAL MARTYRDOM IN THE SUNNI TRADITION 
With the exception of the 10th century, Sunni Muslims have historically been 
dominant in the Muslim world and make up 85 percent of the Muslim population today.  
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These demographic facts have not only yielded a sense of general superiority, but have 
also led Sunnis to not even consider other sects, like the Shia, truly part of Islam.  The 
lack of oppression over the centuries, once Sunnis took over political control of the umma 
(greater Muslim community), means that their perception of martyrdom was noticeably 
different from that of the Shia who have a long history of persecution.  It also means that 
concepts of martyrdom in Sunni Islam date mostly from the earliest periods of Islam, 
during the great Islamic conquests.  One of the most important examples of martyrdom 
during this time for Sunnis is Hamza, the Prophet Muhammad’s uncle, who was killed at 
the Battle of Uhud (625).  He was the target of a bounty hunt by the Quraysh tribe in 
retribution for him killing one of their members.  After being killed by a spear, his body 
was desecrated and the daughter of a man Hamza had killed ate his liver.  While other 
early companions were killed on the battlefield, Hamza’s closeness to the Prophet and the 
gruesome circumstances of his death made him a symbol of martyrdom.32   
Another of the few historical examples of martyrdom that are important in the 
Sunni tradition is the assassination of Caliph ‘Uthman, in Medina in 656.  ‘Uthman was 
the third Caliph, although he was considered a weak ruler and disliked throughout parts 
of the Muslim world.  Specifically, groups in Iraq and Egypt were displeased with his 
policies and they sent delegations to protest grievances against ‘Uthman.  When the 
demonstrations against ‘Uthman took a turn toward violence, other companions of the 
Prophet, including ‘Ali b. Abi Talib (the prophet’s cousin/son-in-law and future Caliph), 
protected him until the situation calmed down. However, on the way back home, the 
Egyptian delegation turned angry when they became convinced that ‘Uthman had 
deceived them and sent a letter ahead to the Egyptian government that would lead to their 
arrest when they returned home.33  They returned to Medina and laid siege to ‘Uthman’s 
house, denying him food and water.  It is not clear, however, whether there were any 
serious attempts by the other companions in Medina to help ‘Uthman break the siege the 
second time.  When the Egyptian mob heard there were troops from Syria loyal to 
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‘Uthman coming to rescue him, the Egyptians burst into his house and stabbed him nine 
times, and his blood drained onto the copy of the Quran he had been reading.  The tale of 
a Muslim mob murdering an eighty-year-old pious Muslim while he read the Quran, who 
was the Caliph and former companion of the prophet no less, provided stunning imagery 
that shocked the conscience of the Muslim world.  Later, the Umayyads, who had been 
supporters of ‘Uthman, promoted and enhanced the tale of his martyrdom in propaganda 
they used against their enemies during the Umayyad Dynasty (661–747).  The ongoing 
veneration of ‘Uthman and the slogan crying for vengeance on his behalf continued 
during the Umayyad dynasty that relocated to Spain (754–1031).34   
After ‘Uthman, because the Sunnis were the majority, as a group they were not 
persecuted in such a way that would generate martyrs that fit the classic narrative.  One 
example of a non-traditional martyr would be Ahmad b. Hanbal (d. 855), one of the 
greatest Sunni scholars and the founder of the Hanbali school of Islam. Ibn Hanbal was 
tortured for maintaining his belief in the uncreated nature of the Quran, but was not killed 
defending it.  During the ‘Abbasid dynasty in the 9th century, certain caliphs tried to push 
the religious doctrine of the Mu’tazilite sect onto the ulama, which included the tenet of 
the Quran, which is tangible, being created like other beings and creatures on earth.  
While largely successful convincing the majority of religious scholars to adopt the 
Mu’tazilite ‘created Quran’ doctrine, Ibn Hanbal refused to change his beliefs regarding 
the nature of the Quran.  Ibn Hanbal maintained that the Quran is the word of God; 
therefore it had always existed and was merely revealed to the Prophet.  For his refusal to 
renounce his beliefs, he was arrested and taken to the court of the Caliph.  Despite being 
whipped repeatedly until he was bleeding profusely, not an easy ordeal to survive for a 
man in his mid-fifties, he refused to change his position, instead reciting verses to the 
Quran as he was whipped.  Some of the lore surrounding the tale recounts him having a 
hair from the Prophet Muhammad in a pocket that helped protect him and survive his 
ordeal.35  While he did not die, Hanbal, a very pious religious scholar, willingly endured 
                                                 
34  Cook, Martyrdom in Islam, 49. 
35  Account from Ibn al-Jawzi, Manaqib al-Imam Ahmad b. Hanbal, 326–335, as quoted in Cook, 
Martyrdom in Islam, 51–52.   
 21
torture that could have killed him because of his dedication to his beliefs, which was 
enough for him to achieve martyrdom status within the Sunni tradition.     
Another difference between Sunni and Shia fiqh (jurisprudence) has to do with the 
hadiths relating to the behavior of the Muslims engaged in war.  Sunni scholars seem to 
take a more rationalistic and pragmatic approach, emphasizing victory and survival rather 
than death.  In fact, there are strong prohibitions in Sunni literature against trying to 
deliberately seek death in battle, as this was too close the radical Kharajite philosophy.  
Along these lines, there are numerous traditions that prohibit wishing for death, or even 
hoping to encounter the enemy.  One example found in Boukhari states:  “None of you 
should long for death, for if he is a good man, he may increase his good deeds and if he is 
an evil-doer, he may stop the evil deeds and repent.”36 This tradition clearly places more 
value on living than on trying to attain the glory associated with martyrdom.    
Another story from the hadith recalls a Muslim who appeared to be a brave 
warrior in battle, garnering praise from fellow Muslims.  The Prophet Muhammad 
disagreed, instead saying the warrior would go to hell, confusing his Muslim audience.  
However, the next day, when the brave warrior was severely wounded, he fell on his 
sword and killed himself rather than seek comfort from his fellow Muslims.  The Prophet 
stated in response:  
A man may be seen to the people as if he were practicing the deeds of the 
people of Paradise when in fact he is from the people of the [Hell] fire, 
another may seem to [be] of the [Hell] fire, while in fact he is from the 
people of Paradise.37      
Two lessons can be gleaned from this story: one, that appearances can be deceiving, and 
two, that suicide, even in the heat of battle, is forbidden.  Classical Sunni fiqh also has 
very strict rules regarding other facets of warfare including the what kinds of damage 
could be inflicted on different categories of enemies, the protection of innocents and non-
combatants, determination ns on who was exempt from jihad, and treatment of captives 
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and prisoners of war.  May of these classical rules of Sunni jurisprudence seem to be at 
obvious odds with contemporary martyrdom expression, and we will cover this more in 
depth in later sections.        
After the early centuries of Islam, it was rare for the Sunni religious figures to be 
at odds with the Muslim rulers because of their close association with the ruling dynasty 
or heads of state.  Those that were tortured or executed were the victims of capricious 
rulers, not necessarily involved in righteous political rebellion, and hence did not warrant 
martyr status.38 As the above review of the classical Sunni literature regarding warfare 
has shown, there was no great emphasis on martyrdom.  This lack of consistent 
martyrology throughout the whole of Sunni Muslim history is one of the reasons 
contemporary Sunni organizations have been able to recreate and redefine the nature of 
martyrdom in the twentieth century.   
B. HISTORICAL MARTYRDOM IN THE SHIA TRADITION 
Unlike Sunni Islam, in the Shia tradition there is a continuous 1,400-year legacy 
of martyrdom and suffering, all stemming from the belief that Islamic history was 
derailed when political power passed out of the hands of the Prophet Muhammad’s 
family in the 7th century.39  Shiites believe that ‘Ali b. Abi Talib, the ward, cousin, 
companion and son-in-law of the Prophet was the only rightful successor to the Prophet 
Muhammad, and that ‘Ali’s descendents were the rightful heirs to the political leadership 
of the Caliphate.  During the Umayyad and ‘Abbasid Dynasties, Islamic scholars and 
intellectuals who supported the rights of the Prophet’s family and descendents, were 
frustrated at their treatment and frequent assassination and tended to expand upon their 
martyrdom.  These works became very important in Shia literature and helped to 
delineate it as distinct from Sunni conceptions of martyrdom.  
An excellent example of this veneration of Shia martyrs is found in the writings of 
Abu al-Faraj al-Isfahani (d. 967), which captured the suffering of the Prophet’s 
                                                 
38  Cook, Martyrdom in Islam, 52. 
39  Martin Kramer, "Hizbullah: The Calculus of Jihad," in Fundamentalisms and the State, eds. Martin 
E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), 540. 
 23
descendents.  Although he himself was not a Shiite, al-Isfahani’s martyrology of the 
descendents of the Prophet included the stories of 189 family members killed by the time 
of its publishing.40  The power conveyed by the stories of these martyrs has provided 
significant propaganda for the Shiite community throughout the centuries and ensured 
that martyrdom is an essential part of their belief system and history.  It is difficult for a 
non-Muslim to grasp the power and depth of feeling shahadat (martyrdom) wields in 
Shia Islam, so perhaps it is best to let one of them attempt to describe it:  
The story of shahadat and that which shahadat challenges is so sensitive, 
so belovedly exciting that it pulls the spirit toward the fire.  It paralyzes 
logic.  It weakens speech.  It even makes thinking difficult.  Shahadat is a 
mixture of a refined love and a deep, complex wisdom.  One cannot 
express these two at the same time and so, one cannot do them justice.41       
The first great martyr venerated in Shia Islam is ‘Ali b. Abi Talib, who became 
the fourth Caliph (656–61) after the assassination of Uthman.  ‘Ali won many battles as 
Caliph, but when the battle of Siffin in 657 against the Syrians ended in a draw, he agreed 
to a process of arbitration.  This greatly angered those who would become known as the 
Kharijites, who believed that by agreeing to a process of arbitration, ‘Ali had denied 
God’s will to be expressed on the battlefield.  ‘Ali was forced to fight the Kharajites at 
the Battle of Nahrawan in 658, where he defeated them.  Relatives of the Kharajites who 
were killed by ‘Ali’s forces at Nahrawan longed for revenge against ‘Ali, and the 
daughter of one of the deceased convinced a man to assassinate ‘Ali in return for her 
hand in marriage.  In 661, the new husband assassinated ‘Ali with a poisoned sword 
while ‘Ali was leading a worship service in Kufa (present day Iraq).  The symbolism of 
‘Ali’s death is very powerful, similar to that of ‘Uthman, with his being assassinated as 
he was praying and reciting from the Quran at the time of his attack.42  The assassin is 
said to have recited Quran 2:207 as he killed ‘Ali: “And of the people is he who sells 
himself, seeking means to the approval of Allah.  And Allah is kind to [His] servants.” 
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The assassin’s quote of this particular verse is worth noting because this same verse is 
used in modern times to help justify suicide bombing attacks.             
As significant as the martyrdom of ‘Ali is, in Shia mythology it pales in 
comparison to the martyrdom of his younger son, al-Husayn in Karbala, in Iraq in 680.  
After ‘Ali’s death in 661, ‘Ali’s elder son, al-Hasan, agreed to let the governor of Syria, 
Mu’awiya b. Abi Sufyan Mu’awiya, take the caliphate and the unchallenged political rule 
of the Muslim world, although those who would later become Shia considered al-Hasan 
to be their true Imam.43  Al-Hasan died a short time later and the Shia recognized his 
younger brother, al-Husayn, as their new Imam.  Al-Husayn remained mostly quiet in 
Medina, biding his time until Mu’awiya’s death in 680.  Before his death, Mu’awiya 
proclaimed his son, Yazid, to be the new Caliph, but Yazid had many problems including 
being a womanizer, prone to corruption, and publicly drinking alcohol.  Accepting an 
invitation from the citizens of Kufa to relocate there, possibly to organize forces to 
overthrow the problematic Yazid, al-Husayn left Medina with his family and only a small 
band of supporters despite warnings of the extreme danger from many, including 
surviving Companions of the Prophet.  Husayn was very aware of the dangers as he 
publicly stated to the Muslims in Mecca that he knew he would be martyred and that they 
should also offer their lives in “the path of God.”44 
The Umayyad governor, Yazid, of course viewed this relocation as a threat and 
dispatched troops to find al-Husayn’s party.  The Umayyad troops found al-Husayn and 
his party on the Euphrates River in Karbala, Iraq on October 10, 680 (also known as the 
10th of Muharram or ‘Ashura’ in the Muslim hijri calendar) and prevented them from 
getting water.  Slowly dying of dehydration, the Ummayad troops killed members of al-
Husayn’s party one by one, including all of his family except one son.  Al-Husayn was 
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witness to all of this as he was one of the last to die, fighting nobly to the end to obtain 
water for the women and non-combatants and caring for his fallen children.45  
According to the Muslim historian Tabari, the night before his death, Husayn 
gave the following speech:  
You see what this matter has come to.  Indeed, the world has changed, and 
it has changed for the worse.  Its goodness has retreated, and it regards 
good as bitter.  Or, there remain only the dregs like the dregs in a jar, 
sordid nourishment like unhealthy fodder.  Can you not see that truth is no 
longer something that men practice and falsehood is no longer desisted 
from, so that the believer rightly desires to meet God.  I can only regard 
death as martyrdom and life with these oppressors as a tribulation.46           
Husayn’s belief that martyrdom was his only option in the face of the oppression and 
tyranny of the corrupt Yazid was instrumental in defining how Shiites came to view jihad 
and martyrdom.  Husayn’s was not a battlefield death; he knew he was going to be killed 
before he left Medina but risking death was something he thought long about and decided 
to do anyway because it was the righteous thing to do.  Once surrounded and under siege, 
he rejected the offers of compromise by Yazid’s governor that would have allowed him 
to live, as compromising with evil was not an acceptable option.  Husayn and all of his 
fighters were massacred, their bodies deliberately trampled by horses, and their heads 
severed and mounted on lances in a grim procession that left Karbala for Kufa.  
Eventually, Husayn’s head was delivered to Yazid in Damascus. 
Navid Kermani eloquently describes the humiliating effect the brutal murder of 
Husayn and the desecration of his body had on the Shia:  
The humiliation of the murdered son-in-law of the Prophet, perpetrated – 
out of all people – by the leader of the Umayyads, the most fervent 
opponents of the Prophet, constitutes more than a shame to those defeated 
[by the Umayyads].  It represents the restoration of the pre-Islamic rule of 
the nobility that Islam seemed to have done away with. The fact that, in 
the following year, Yazid ordered a three-day massacre in Medina, and a 
year later the destruction of the Kaba, completes the picture of the 
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usurpation…To the Shia, the betrayal of everything that Muhammad 
represented by divine decree…is the original event upon which they 
interpret the entire subsequent and failed history of Islam, which has been 
stolen by the Sunnis—the Fall of man as a historical event.47   
While virtually all Muslims are horrified at what happened to al-Husayn and his family, 
among Shi’ites the horror is transformed into guilt, sorrow, and an extreme focus on 
mourning that is reminiscent of how some Christians view the death of Jesus.48  The Shia 
often refer to Husayn as As-Sayyid al-Shuhada (The Master of the Martyrs) and use 
Husayn as a baseline with which to compare all other acts of martyrdom.49 This 
obsession with mourning for the martyrdom of al-Husayn, and the rituals associated with 
its commemoration during the ‘Ashura, form a part of the chasm that divides the two 
main sects of Islam.   
Another theological difference between Shia and Sunni Islam that affects their 
understanding of martyrdom is regarding when and how to wage jihad.  Specifically, 
Shiites believe that jihad can only be doctrinally waged under the leadership of the 
rightful Imam.  Since the twelfth Imam entered occultation in 873, this poses a problem, 
since only the Imam was infallible enough to judge when jihad should be waged.  But 
this ideology has not always been adhered to; for example, some prominent Shia ulama 
during the Safavid Empire (1502–1779) supported the Safavid Shahs’ claims that they 
had authority to reign as representatives of the Hidden Imam and that all of the judicial 
functions, including declaring a defensive military jihad, could be performed by the 
ulama.  This was a significant change from the previous Shia tradition of withdrawal and 
even dissimulation, which was only made possible by Shia Islam becoming the official 
religion of the Safavid Empire.50     
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Later, during the Qajar period in Iran, Sheikh Ja’far Kashif al-Ghita (1812–13) 
proclaimed that the mujtahids (scholars authorized to infer legal rulings) had the duty to 
defend Islam by declaring jihad during the occultation.51  The ulama did declare a 
defensive jihad in 1804 against the invading Russian army, but after that, the ulama 
practiced quietism and mostly avoided politics until the 1960s.  However, there was not, 
nor has there ever been consensus amongst Shia scholars on who has the authority to 
declare jihad.  Although the predominant contemporary view is that “lesser souls” may 
fulfill the responsibilities of the Imam in his absence (including the declaring of jihad), it 
is interesting to note that during the Iran-Iraq war, the leaders in the Iranian government, 
which was composed of prominent Shia scholars, avoided using the term jihad, even 
though it was clearly a defensive war.52      
The specific differences in Shia martyrs like al-Husayn are informative for 
illustrating why the concept of martyrdom developed differently over the centuries in 
Sunni and Shia Islam.  For Sunnis, who form the vast majority of Islam and historically 
were in charge of the Muslim caliphate, martyrdom was typically a choice to fight, a 
victory and death in a fight against non-Muslims.  For Shiites, a persecuted minority, 
martyrdom was usually imposed upon them, and almost always by other Muslims.  These 
historical differences may help explain critical contemporary differences in how Sunnis 
and Shiites view jihad and the need to justify suicide attacks.  While contemporary Sunni 
literature and videos go to great lengths to quantify and glorify the rewards for 
martyrdom, validating an individual’s choice, there are no comparable materials in Shiite 
Islam.  In Shia history, martyrdom was not an option but something that was imposed, so 
there was no need to justify an individual’s choice.  These differences will be important 
during the analysis of the most common contemporary expression of martyrdom in Islam, 
suicide bombings.  
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III. CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT OF MARTYRDOM IN ISLAM 
The life of the Muslim Ummah [community] is solely dependent upon the 
ink of its scholars and the blood of its martyrs. What is more beautiful 
than the writing of the Ummah’s history with both the ink of a scholar and 
his blood, such that the map of Islamic history becomes colored with two 
lines: one of them black…and the other one red.   – Abdullah Yussuf 
Azzam 
 
Amongst Shia Islam, we see modern examples of suicide martyrdom in the 
Iranian Bassidj organization, where thousands of young Iranian boys sacrificed 
themselves to clear mines for the Iranian army during the Iran-Iraq war.  Shia militants 
from Islamic Jihad bombed the U.S. embassy and French barracks in Beirut in 1983, and 
Hezbollah has a history of using suicide attacks against Israeli occupation forces in 
southern Lebanon through the late 1980s.53  However, it is striking that since the times of 
these examples, there are no campaigns of Shia martyrdom operations.  Even during the 
2006 Israeli incursion into Lebanon, Hezbollah launched no suicide attacks.  With the 
possible exception of the suicide bombing of a Jewish center in Argentina in 1994, there 
has not been a confirmed suicide bombing committed by a Shia organization since the 
1980s.54 
Even with hundreds of suicide attacks carried out against Shia civilians in Iraq 
and Pakistan by Sunni radicals since 1994, there is not a single instance of a counter-
suicide attack (although there was much retaliation in the form of death squads and 
targeted bombings).  One explanation for this phenomenon is the difference in the 
relationship of the Shia ulama with that of the Sunni ulama.  Within Shia Islam there is 
an organized and formal hierarchy of their religious scholars, and the devotion to which 
the Shia population follows their most accomplished clergy is one of the characteristics 
that sets Shia Islam apart from their Sunni brethren.  Without the Shia ulama condoning 
attacks that target civilians and Muslims, Shia radicals are very unlikely to execute those 
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types of suicide attacks.  However, historically and to this day, the prominent Sunni 
clergy are viewed as being co-opted by their rulers and lackeys of their governments.  
Consequently, less accomplished Sunni scholars, or even radical Sunni Muslims with 
little religious training, have had no problems pushing the limits of what is acceptable 
within Islam when conducting martyrdom operations. 
A. CONTEMPORARY MARTRYDOM IN SHIITE ISLAM 
As we have seen in the historical context section, there is little support for suicide 
bombings to be considered true martyrdom operations within the classical sources of 
Islamic law and jurisprudence.  There are too many unanswered questions, too many 
contradictions, and little to no religious text between the Quran, sunna and hadith that 
would justify suicide bombings. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, there was a major 
reinterpretation of theology and religious law concerning military jihad and martyrdom 
by Shiite scholars in Iraq and Iran.55 This Shiite revival began in Najaf, after the Ba’ath 
secularists took control of Iraq in 1963.  While the Ba’athists and the Sunni minority 
benefitted greatly from the oil boom, the Shia in the south did not benefit in kind from the 
economic development, remaining the targets of oppression and discrimination by the 
Sunni Ba’athist regime.   
This disparity led to new ideas amongst the Shia ulama, especially the Ayatollah 
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, who argued that the Shia needed to take control of their own 
destiny instead of letting misguided Sunnis and their colonial masters determine the fate 
of the whole Muslim community.56 This new Shia internationalism would require an 
Islamic revolution fueled by the reinterpretation of jihad and shahadat and a revival of 
the original Shia concept of the martyrdom of Hussein.57  With an international Islamic 
revolution, the Shia scholars felt they could save the greater Muslim community from 
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going to hell due to the corrupting influence of secularism and colonialism.  While there 
are similarities to the Sunni revivalism that was occurring in Egypt with the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Sayyid Qutb at approximately the same time, there are important 
differences that help explain why “self-sacrifice operations” originally developed within 
the Shia tradition, and not within the Sunni Islamist organizations.  These differences will 
be highlighted in the following sections on contemporary Sunni revivalism. 
As previously mentioned, Baqir al-Sadr in Iraq was a preeminent figure at the 
heart of the Shia revival.  Al-Sadr was a strong influence on Muhammad Husayn 
Fadlallah, who would later become the spiritual leader of Hezbollah, and Ruhollah 
Khomeini, who would lead the Iranian Islamic Revolution.  Al-Sadr’s ideas also led to 
the formation of the Hizb al-Da’wah al-Islamiyyah (The Party of the Islamic Call) in 
Iraq, which objected to the secular and anti-Shia policies of the Ba’ath regime.  These 
policies included selling pork, hindering repairs to mosques, the shuttering of Islamic 
publications and persecuting Shiite clergy.58 One of Khomeini’s students published a 
pamphlet in Persian in 1968 called The Eternal Martyr, which envisioned Husayn’s 
martyrdom at Karbala as a political uprising that all Shia should emulate.59  In the midst 
of the Shia revival in 1974, Shia Ashura processions in Iraq broke into widespread 
violent political protests against the government.  The recurring protests led to Ashura 
processions being banned in 1977 and a campaign of harsh state repression against Iraqi 
Shia by the Sunni government.60  The turn to violent contentious action by the Iraqi Shia 
masses in the 1970s was an initial indicator of the success by the Shia clergy in Najaf to 
refocus their community on jihad, martyrdom, and Islamic governance; Baqir al-Sadr, 
Khomeini, and Fadlallah helped form the lens that refocused the community.     
   It is worth reviewing the events that resulted in Khomeini being exiled from 
Iran and settling in Najaf.  In 1963, the Pahlevi regime had sent paratroopers into a 
madrasa in Qum, who killed a number of students.  Khomeini protested this action a 
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number of times in famous speeches where he equated the students with martyrs like 
Husayn, and the tyranny of the Shah’s government with Husayn’s tormentor, Yazid.61 
After being arrested and imprisoned, Khomeini eventually brokered an agreement that 
allowed him to go into exile, staying briefly in Turkey and finally settling in Najaf with 
his fellow Shia ulama. After Iraq exiled him to France in 1978, Khomeini was actually 
able to transmit his message of jihad and martyrdom even more effectively to the masses 
in Iran via cassette tapes.  Khomeini pulled from the wealth of intellectual and emotional 
heritage of Shia martyrdom and molded an attractive and radical message.  By 
representing Husayn as a proactive willing martyr rather than just a passive tragic figure, 
Khomeini was successful in changing the accepted expression of Shia Islam from quietist 
to radical.  He is credited with saying, “the action of seeking martyrdom is among the 
highest forms of martyrdom and sacrifice in the path of religion…there is no difference 
between male and female [in this].”62 Eventually Khomeini’s message facilitated the 
Iranian Islamic Revolution and he returned triumphantly after the fall of the Shah. 
Among the many Iranian clerics who returned to Iran from Najaf after the 
revolution was Ayatollah Sayyid Mahmud Taleqani (1910–1979), who took a position in 
the new government.  When the government of Iran began to actively export its Islamic 
revolution, Taleqani’s views on martyrdom took on increased prominence.  His radical 
views advocating self-annihilation in the path towards martyrdom took Khomeini’s 
message even further along the path toward suicide bombing and were made quite clear 
in a speech he gave in Tehran in 1963: 
In short, anyone who has understood this truth and divine goal and has 
stood for it, sacrificing his life is called shahid in the terminology of the 
Quran and jurisprudence.  The shahid is the one who has experience the 
shuhud (vision) of truth.  The sacrifice of his own life is not based on 
illusion or agitation of his emotions.  He has seen the truth and the goal.  
That is why he has chosen to wallow in the blood and the dust.  Such a 
person does so with the intention of intimacy with God, not on the basis of 
fantasies and personal desires.  He is above these worldly matters.  He has 
understood the value of truth in a deserved way.  This is why he 
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annihilates himself, like a drop in the ocean of truth… If a person has 
reached the stage of readiness for self-annihilation through the vision of 
truth, for the sake of establishing truth, his title is shahid.  Thus, one 
cannot call everyone shahid.  If someone mistakenly or for a worldly and 
illusive cause gets killed, he has lost both worlds, this and the hereafter.  A 
shahid is the one who understands religion, knows his god, and believes in 
the hereafter as well as in eternal life.  He must realize the goal. Then 
because he has seen the truth, he has no fear of death.  Death is easy for 
him.63    
The parallels between achieving martyrdom through self-annihilation, as long as the 
motives are pure, and the martyrology of suicide bombers are crystal clear.  
 While not a classically trained religious scholar like Taleqani, another prominent 
influence on the revival and reinterpretation of martyrdom within Shia Islam during this 
period was Dr. Ali Shari’ati (1933–1977).  While Shari’ati was not physically part of the 
revival in Najaf, Khomeini acknowledged later that he was “greatly influential.”64 
Shari’ati does an excellent job of explaining how the Shia view the martyrdom of Husayn 
and Hamzah as being fundamentally different in a speech given at the Grand Mosque in 
Tehran the day after Ashura, 1970: 
Hamzah is a mujahid [jihad warrior] who is killed in the midst of jihad, 
but Husayn is a shahid who attains shahadat before he is killed….A 
shahid is a  person who, from the beginning of his decision, chooses his 
own shahadat, even though months or even years may pass.  If we want to 
explain the fundamental difference between the two kinds of shahadat, we 
must say that, in Hamzah’s case, it is the death which chooses him.  In 
other worlds, it is a kind of shahadat that chooses the shahid. In Husayn’s 
case, it is quite the contrary.  The shahid chooses his own shahadat.  
Husayn has chosen shahadat, but Hamzah has been chosen by shahadat.65 
In the same speech, Shari’ati goes on to explain the purpose of martyrdom: 
Shahadat has such a unique radiance; it creates light and heat in the world 
and in the cold and dark hearts.  In the paralyzed wills and thought, 
immersed in stagnation and darkness, and in the memories which have 
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forgotten all the truths and reminiscence, it creates movement, vision, and 
hope and provides will, mission, and commitment.  The thought, “Nothing 
can be done,” changes into, “Something can be done,” or even, 
“Something must be done.”… By his death, he does not choose to flee the 
hard an uncomfortable environment.  He does not choose shame.  Instead 
of a negative flight, he commits a positive attack.  By this death, he 
condemns the oppressor and provides commitment for the oppressed. … 
He reminds people of what has already been forgotten.  In the icy hearts of 
a people, he bestows the blood of life, resurrection, and movement. For 
those who have become accustomed to captivity and thus think of 
captivity as a permanent state, the blood of a shahid is a rescue vessel.66 
 In another lecture from 1970, Shari’ati summarizes the difference between 
martyrdom in Shia versus Sunni Islam: 
Shahadat, in summary, in our culture, contrary to other schools where it is 
considered to be an accident, and involvement, a death imposed upon a 
hero, a tragedy, is a grade, a level, a rank.  It is not a means but it is a goal 
itself.  It is originality.  It is a completion.  It is a lift.  It itself is mid-way 
to the highest peak of humanity and it is a culture.  In all ages and 
centuries, when the followers of a faith and an idea have power, they 
guarantee their honor and lives with jihad. But when they are weakened 
and have no means whereby to struggle, they guarantee their lives, 
movement, faith, respect, honor, future and history with shahadat.  
Shahadat is an invitation to all generations, in all ages, if you cannot kill 
your oppressor, then die.67  
 Before continuing on, it is worth noting that there is no authority outside of God 
in Islam that can declare someone a martyr, even if individuals are referred to that way 
because of their actions and the circumstances of their deaths.  Since only God can know 
what was in their minds at the time of their deaths, others will often reference those who 
die as “martyrs, God willing.”68  The lack of a formal, accepted process for granting 
martyrdom in either Sunni or Shia Islam generates a couple of effects.  First, it means that 
despite the declaration of martyrdom by an organization or government, that individual 
may not be accepted as a martyr by the greater Muslim community.  Second, and most 
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importantly, it allowed modern Shia scholars to reinterpret the concept of martyrdom, and 
justify mass suicidal attacks by young Iranian children, and eventually suicide bombings.  
The Shia ulama revival and revision of martyrdom and jihad was firmly solidified 
by the spectacular success of the Iranian revolution. It was this new martyrdom ideology 
that helps explain how and why the religious scholars of the Iranian government sent 
thousands of Iranian children on suicidal missions to clear mine fields or overrun fortified 
positions during the Iran-Iraq war as Bassidj martyrs. In one assault, the Iranian 
government called “Karbala,” more than 23,000 Iranian boys aged twelve to thirteen 
swarmed across minefields towards Iraqi machine gun emplacements.  They rushed 
forward with keys to unlock the doors to paradise dangling from their necks and cries of 
“Ya Karbala, Ya Husayn, Ya Khomeini!” spouting from their mouths, but all of them 
were slaughtered in less than a day.69 As the Iranian government exported this extreme 
revision of martyrdom ideology, it is no surprise then that suicide bombing would first be 
developed as a modern tactic among Iran’s Shia protégés in Lebanon in the early 1980s.  
If the Shia ulama thought sacrificing thousands of children to defend the homeland 
against Iraq was acceptable to Allah, then Hezbollah sending individual adult suicide 
bombers to die a glorious death defending against Israeli aggression in southern Lebanon 
was an easy step in the evolution of contemporary martyrdom ideology.  Because the 
Hezbollah is credited with pioneering “self-martyrdom operations” in Lebanon, it is 
worthwhile to study the genesis of Shiite fundamentalism in Lebanon, specifically the 
political and religious context under which Hezbollah was conceived.       
1. Hezbollah  
Hezbollah is fascinating to study as a social movement for many reasons.  
Although it represents just half of the Shia sect, in a very small multi-sectarian country 
with an annual budget less than half that of the University of Chicago, it has commanded 
the world’s attention since its inception in 1982.  Hezbollah owes its fame to its ingenuity 
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and mastery of violence, specifically violence committed in the name of Islam.70  This 
section will analyze both how the ideology of jihad and martyrdom that developed in Iraq 
and Iran in the 1960s and 1970s, spread, grew and prospered amongst the Shiite Muslims 
in the small Mediterranean country of Lebanon.      
Lebanon’s Shiite Muslims settled in the mountains in the south of Lebanon and 
on the plains of the Bekaa Valley, protected by two high mountain ranges. However, 
while they were fairly secure in these locations, their relative isolation also meant that 
they were the slowest to modernize and integrate into the greater Lebanese society.  
When Lebanon became independent in 1946, the Shiites became the outsiders in a state 
that was created for, and governed by, Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims.  
Demographically, Lebanon’s Shia population outgrew the other confessional populations 
so much so that by 1975, they constituted 30 percent of the total population (up from 19 
percent in 1921), larger than the Maronites or Sunnis separately.71 While some Shia were 
able to take advantage of the new opportunities for education and commerce in Beirut 
and other cities, most of the Shia population was unable to close the economic divide.  
When the civil war broke out in 1975, a social movement comprised of progressive Shia 
clerics and middle class professionals formed a militia named Amal (Hope) to protect the 
interests of the Shia community.  Amal maintained a mostly defensive posture during the 
civil war, but was caught in the crossfire between Maronite-Palestinian fighting in 1976.  
Then the Israeli invasion produced hundreds of thousands of Shia refugees that fled to the 
outskirts of Beirut in 1978 where disgusting slums reeking of garbage and human waste 
developed.72  
With the success of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the calls for a reform of the 
confessional political system in Lebanon and the creation of an Islamic state for the now- 
majority Muslim population gained a newfound resonance.  With the Maronite slaughter 
of Palestinian refugees, the ongoing Israeli occupation and the deployment of U.S. and 
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French troops to Beirut, the pressure was too great on Amal, and the Shiite community 
fractured.  Hundreds of Amal fighters left for the Bekaa valley where they joined forces 
with Iranian revolutionary guard forces, seized a Lebanese army barracks, and built a 
formidable fortress complete with anti-aircraft artillery and modern communications 
equipment.  The new organization took the name Hezbollah (the Party of God) from a 
verse in the Quran (V, 56): “Lo! The Party of God, they are the victorious.”73 The 
contribution Israel’s invasion of Lebanon had on the formation of Hezbollah cannot be 
dismissed.  Ehud Barak even conceded in a Newsweek interview in 2006, “When we 
entered Lebanon… there was no Hezbollah.  We were accepted with perfumed rice and 
flowers by the Shia in the south.  It was our presence there that created Hezbollah.”74 
Israel’s continued occupation of Lebanon, instead of promptly withdrawing, provided the 
fertilizer that allowed Hezbollah to grow and prosper. 
Hezbollah successfully recruited Shiite clerics that were rejected by Amal due to 
their being unable to finish their training in Iraq after Iraq expelled all the foreign Shia 
scholars studying there.  Hezbollah also recruited members of prominent Shia families 
from the Bekaa Valley who felt that Amal discriminated against them for leadership 
positions in favor of Shia from southern Lebanon. Additionally, Amal rejected hundreds 
of Shia militants that had served in Palestinian resistance organizations after Israel purged 
Lebanon of the organizations in 1982; Hezbollah was all too happy to recruit these 
militants.  In fact, the infamous ‘Imad Mughniyya, the commander of Hezbollah’s 
clandestine branch of Islamic Jihad, was one of these fighters who had extensive 
Palestinian resistance experience.75  
Another prominent leader and spiritual mentor of Hezbollah was the 
aforementioned Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, who studied under Baqir al-Sadr 
in Najaf, Iraq. The mosque Fadlallah built and guided in Beirut would become the center 
of gravity of Hezbollah within the capitol. Fadlallah illuminated the guiding principle for 
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Hezbollah on the use of violence: “I believe that in all cases violence is like a surgical 
operation that the doctor should only resort to after he has exhausted all other 
methods.”76 The clerics in Hezbollah played an important role in answering the questions 
on whether resistance was mandatory based on religious grounds, and specifically on 
whether self-martyrdom operations were justified since military commanders are not 
authorized to make these religious rulings in Shia Islam. 
Hezbollah’s first suicide bombing, after Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in June 
1982, was an attack on an Israeli headquarters and communication center at Tyre.  In 
November 1982, Shaikh Ahmad Qasir drove a car laden with explosives into the Israeli 
facility, killing at least 75 Israeli officials and soldiers along with 14 Arab prisoners.  The 
attack was so successful and unexpected that Israel did not even know what happened at 
first, and for years, claimed the explosion was the result of a gas leak.77 The attack at 
Tyre was one of twelve “self-martyrdom” operations executed by Hezbollah members. 
However, there are some important distinctions regarding Hezbollah’s martyrdom 
operations.  First, all twelve attacks were targeted against the Israeli occupation forces 
and its allies and were consequently valid military resistance targets.78  Second, the 
twelve attacks by Hezbollah actually represented less than one-third of the suicide 
bombing attacks in Lebanon from 1982 to 2000.  While Hezbollah may have been the 
pioneer of the tactic, groups that were not Shiite, fundamentalist, or even religious, 
quickly imitated this method of suicide attack.  Hezbollah certainly caused the most 
casualties because their innovation granted them the element of surprise in the beginning 
of the campaign, but the greatest number of attacks was actually committed by Syrian-
backed secular nationalist organizations such as the Syrian Social nationalist party and 
the Ba’ath party.79   
While inherently fundamentalist Shia, Hezbollah is also a political organization 
with the goal of implementing sharia (Islamic law) through the waging of jihad.  Because 
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jihad has rules regarding violence, notably regarding punishment and resistance, the 
Muslim public had to believe that Hezbollah’s actions were legitimate resistance, not 
criminal acts.  Shia clerics, therefore, constantly subjected Hezbollah’s target selection 
and techniques to the judgment of sharia, insisting that the waging of jihad not harm 
innocents.  Fadlallah warned, “Parties and movements and organizations begin as great 
ideas, and turn into narrow interests.  Religion starts as a message from God and struggle, 
and turns into the interests of individuals and another kind of tribalism.”80  
The heavy influence the Shia clerics had over targeting selection is evident in the 
fact that Hezbollah never conducted any self-martyrdom operations against Israeli 
civilians, a stark contra-distinction versus what we will later see with Sunni Palestinian 
organizations beginning in 1993.  Harik notes: 
During the course of Hezbollah’s 17-year struggle with Israel along the 
Lebanese/Israeli frontier in southern Lebanon, it has never been 
established by any party directly involved (including the United Nations 
contingent on the ground) that the Party of God has perpetuated a single 
terrorist attack against Israeli civilians … Hezbollah made an early 
strategic decision to exclude terrorist tactics from its jihad against Israeli 
occupation and stuck to it.81   
Hezbollah’s violence can be loosely grouped into four main categories: 1) 
campaigns to rid Lebanon’s Shiite regions from foreign presence; 2) assistance to support 
Iran during the Iran-Iraq war; 3) operations to free members and affiliates that had been 
captured in the Middle East and Europe; and 4) attacks against rival movements in 
Lebanon itself.  It was under the first category that the spectacular suicide attacks against 
the American embassy and its annex were conducted in 1983 and 1984, as well as the 
barracks of the American and French peacekeeping troops in 1983.  The death of the 241 
U.S. Marines and 58 French Paratroopers in that single attack forced a full retreat from 
Lebanon by the U.S. and French forces.82  Sadiq al-Musawi, a Hezbollah leader was 
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quoted as saying, “they hurriedly ran away from three Muslims who loved martyrdom.” 
The spectacular success of the initial suicide bombing attacks also forced Israel to 
withdraw to a narrow “security zone” in the south where Hezbollah continued to attack 
Israeli forces.83   
The destruction of the Iraqi embassy in Beirut in 1981 by the Shia militants, who 
would eventually form Hezbollah, was committed under the auspices of the second 
category, helping Iran in the Iran-Iraq war.  Islamic Jihad also attacked the American and 
French Embassies in Kuwait in 1983, and organized bombings in Paris in 1986 to try to 
convince France to stop supplying Iraq with military equipment.  However, when Iran 
and Iraq signed a cease-fire in 1988, this campaign of violence essentially ended.  
Hezbollah’s hijackings, kidnappings and skirmishes with Amal and Syrian-backed parties 
were representative of the violence from categories three and four; however, suicide 
bombings were not used in support of these goals.84    
Although Fadlallah initially denied involvement with the U.S. and French 
barracks bombing, over time he began to issue statements and edicts based on Islamic 
law that would support such attacks.  In the autumn of 1985, in an interview that 
appeared in the French magazine Politique Internationale, he stated that if the “self-
martyr” was: 
To have the political impact on an enemy whom it is impossible to fight 
by conventional means, then his sacrifice can be part of a jihad.  Such an 
undertaking differs little from that of a soldier who fights and knows that 
in the end he will be killed.  The two situations lead to death; except that 
one fits in with the conventional procedures of war and the other does 
not.85      
Shortly after that interview, Fadlallah expanded on his justification and argued in an 
interview in Kayhan published in November 1985 that: 
The oppressed nations do not have the technology and destructive 
weapons America and Europe have. They must thus fight with special 
means of their own…[We] recognize the right of nations to use every 
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unconventional method to fight these aggressor nations, and do not regard 
what oppressed Muslims of the world do with primitive and 
unconventional means to confront aggressor powers as terrorism.  We 
view this as religiously lawful warfare against the worlds’ imperialist and 
domineering powers.86 
With the clerics defining their resistance as jihad, it freed them from justifying 
their behavior and tactics to the outside world and non-Islamic restraints, but it also 
carried rules. These restrictions and a global focus helped prevent Hezbollah from 
deteriorating into just another sectarian organization.  The clerics kept insisting that 
violence in jihad must not harm innocents in order to remain worthy of Islam, but the 
bombers themselves were dying. Besides the Quranic prohibition of harming innocents, 
the question of whether the suicide bomber was actually committing suicide (also strictly 
forbidden in the Quran) continued to haunt the clerics.  In the beginning, while the 
attacks were so successful, the clerics were willing to suppress this doubt, coming up 
with special exceptions when it would be acceptable.  Fadlallah explained:   
Basically, it is haram (prohibited by religion) to kill oneself or others…but 
during jihad, which is a defensive or preventive war according to Islam, it 
is accepted and allowed, as jihad is considered an exceptional case … 
Allah, did not identify a certain procedure to fight the enemy and defend 
the rights of the nation.87  
However, after the number of enemy casualties generated by suicide attacks began to 
decrease, the doubt resurfaced.  Fadlallah stated, “The self-martyring operation is not 
permitted unless it can convulse the enemy.  The believer cannot blow himself up unless 
the results will equal or exceed the [loss of the] soul of the believer.”88  Eventually the 
clerics banned self-martyrdom operations and Hezbollah discontinued their use.   
 By the 1990s, Hezbollah began to reassess how much violence could actually 
accomplish, especially after Iranian Islamic revolution failed to spread beyond its 
borders.  Hezbollah recognized the new Muslim demographic realities in Lebanon and  
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attempted to recast itself as a champion of democracy instead, and as an official political 
party.89 This rebranding of Hezbollah culminated in great political success in the 
elections of 2005.   
When Israel unilaterally withdrew from Lebanon on May 24, 2000, it could have 
eliminated a strong justification for Hezbollah to maintain an armed militia.  However, 
Israel continued to occupy the Shebaa Farms region in the Golan Heights, an area that 
Lebanon claims as part of its territory.  This continued occupation provided Hezbollah 
with an excuse to maintain a military posture, continue instigating small skirmishes and 
to harass IDF forces from 2000–2006.90  When Hezbollah kidnapped two IDF soldiers in 
2006, however, it provided the excuse Israel needed to launch a full-scale invasion of 
Lebanon to try to dismantle Hezbollah.  However, it should be noted that despite clearly 
fighting a defensive war against Israel, Hezbollah did not return to employing suicide 
attacks during the invasion of 2006.  Whether it was because the Hezbollah clerics and 
leadership felt they could successfully defend against Israel with more conventional 
military tactics, whether Israel had instituted sufficient counter measures against the 
tactic, or whether it was a sign of just how far out of favor the concept of suicide attacks 
had fallen is unclear.  What is clear is that as of 1994, there was a fundamental shift in the 
employment of martyrdom operations in the Muslim world, with Sunni organizations 
picking up the torch that Shia groups had initially lit but set down.  Once Sunni groups 
like Hamas, and later Al Qaeda, began carrying the torch of martyrdom operations, they 
would set the world ablaze with it.           
B. CONTEMPOARY MARTYRDOM IN SUNNI ISLAM 
Contemporary Sunni organizations that employ martyrdom operations attempt to 
create a martyrology that has only a limited basis in the classical Sunni tradition and its 
perception of martyrdom.  Ironically, in attempting to do so, Sunnis are creating a cult of 
martyrdom around the individual martyrs that invokes stories of miracles and 
intercession, examples that are very similar to the critique Sunni scholars have 
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traditionally leveled against the Sufi saints.  In fact, the whole concept of martyrdom 
operations can be described as bid’a (innovation) within Sunni Islam.  Examples used to 
justify this modern phenomenon have only weak ties to classical sources with virtually no 
examples of similar activities conducted by the Prophet Muhammad or his 
Companions.91  While currently there appears to be a consensus among Sunni ulama 
about the general acceptability of their use, there are still disagreements about where, 
under what circumstances, and especially on appropriate targets of martyrdom operations, 
between the moderate and extreme ulama.      
As discussed previously, there was a renaissance in Najaf amongst the Shia 
scholars in the 1960s and 1970s, where they refocused the umma toward a more active 
and aggressive jihad.  However, one can argue that the revival within Sunni Islam started 
earlier, with Hassan al-Banna and the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 
1928.  Banna claimed that the distinction between lesser and greater jihad was fictional, 
and the prophetic traditions that led to this distinction are suspect.  Banna and other early 
Sunni revivalists do not actually reject the great expansion of the criteria for being 
granted martyrdom status that developed over time in the classical literature; instead they 
create a lesser category of martyr for those individuals, reserving “greater martyrdom” 
for those who die struggling against non-belief on the path of God.  Banna also raised 
jihad to the level of a fard ‘ayn (individual obligation) like fasting and daily prayer, 
versus a fard kifayah (collective obligation).  According to classical sources, jihad is a 
collective duty only as long as the threat to the umma remains external.  However, once 
the enemy invades and occupies Muslim territory, it is incumbent upon every Muslim to 
wage jihad to liberate Muslim lands.  For the Muslim Brotherhood, the colonial Middle 
East of the early 20th century clearly qualified as the latter situation.92  Early Muslim 
Brotherhood literature would proclaim, “Whoever dies and has not fought, or had not 
resolved to fight, has died as if he had never been a Muslim.”93 Banna also elaborated on 
how an individual Muslim should prepare himself for a noble death:  
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Brothers! God gives the umma that is skilled in the practice of death and 
that knows how to die a noble death, and exalted life in this world and 
eternal felicity in the next.  What is the fantasy that has reduced us to 
loving this world and hating death?  If you gird yourselves for a lofty deed 
an yearn for death, life shall be given to you…Know, then, that death is 
inevitable, and that it can only happen once.  If you suffer it in the way of 
God, it will profit you in this world and bring you reward in the next.94 
While Banna was focused on the external enemy, Sayyid Abu al-Ala Mawdudi, 
the founder of Jama’at-i-Islami in Pakistan, argued that the Muslim community must first 
wage jihad against anti-Islamic elements within Muslim society itself.  Mawdudi was 
instrumental in redirecting the focus of jihad internally, when he portrayed jihad as a sort 
of social revolution, “a struggle to transform society and to throw off all forms of 
oppression and tyranny that prevent real obedience to God.”95 Mawdudi, therefore, 
expanded the target set of jihad to any entity that interferes with God’s sovereignty, 
regardless of whether it was Muslim or non-Muslim, within the umma or external to it.  
However, Mawdudi did not advance his ideology to justify armed struggle against 
existing power structures, nor did he write much on the subject of martyrdom.  While the 
Jama’at-i-Islami has recognized martyrs in Pakistan’s conflict with India, it has not taken 
up arms against the Pakistani government; instead, it has focussed on reforming the 
system from within existing political structures versus advocating for a revolution to 
overthrow them.   
Subsequent to al-Banna and Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb continued to refocus Sunni 
Islam on jihad, especially during his years in an Egyptian prison from 1954 to 1964, 
when he wrote Milestones and In the Shade of the Quran.  Qutb used stories of Muslim 
martyrs in Milestones, including the story of the Companions and the pit from the Quran 
(85:1–9).  Qutb made it clear that the price for jihad could be martyrdom since the world 
would never allow a free expression of Islam.96  Because of the widespread publication 
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of his literary works and his prominent position in the Muslim Brotherhood, Qutb became 
an important and influential intellectual figure in the Sunni revival.  Qutb’s vision of a 
more aggressive role for Islamists was well received by the violent Egyptian jihadist 
organizations, which eventually assassinated Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and 
declared an open rebellion against the Egyptian government.97 
One of the co-conspirators in the Sadat assassination, Muhammad Abd al-Salam 
Faraj, clearly demonstrated Qutb’s influence in his pamphlet, The Neglected Duty, which 
was published and circulated in Cairo in the Early 1980s.  In it, Faraj argues that at their 
core, the Quran and hadith are about warfare, and that jihad was meant to be taken 
literally.  The neglected duty is in fact jihad, which calls for “fighting, which meant 
confrontation and blood” and should be considered a sixth pillar of Islam.98  Faraj echoes 
Qutb in his condemnation of Muslims who refuse to wage jihad against apostate Muslim 
regimes.  However, Faraj goes further in claiming that Muslims that do not wage jihad 
against corrupt rulers are valid targets of jihad themselves.  Even more disturbing, was 
Faraj’s assertion that since peaceful and legal means of fighting apostasy were 
inadequate, the true soldier of Islam is permitted to use almost any means necessary to 
achieve a righteous goal including deceit, trickery and violence.  Faraj did say that killing 
innocent bystanders and women was to be avoided when possible in assassination 
attempts, but re-emphasized that all “true” Muslims should be waging the jihad of the 
sword against infidels and apostates anyway.99  Ayman Zawahiri, who would later gain 
fame as part of Al Qaeda, which will be discussed more in depth in later sections, mirrors 
Faraj’s arguments when providing his support to the Egyptian jihadist movement. 
Within The Neglected Duty are a number of sections that extol the virtues of 
martyrdom and citations of hadiths, which call on Muslims to fight the infidels to the 
death.  However, the hadiths cited are accounts of Muslims from the time of the Prophet, 
who refused to surrender, and in turn were killed by the enemy.  However, it is important 
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to note that while Faraj’s pamphlet clearly advocates violence in waging jihad, unlike the 
literature from the Shia revival, there is no mention of the Martyrdom of Husayn, nor 
does he suggest that Muslims should intentionally annihilate themselves when waging 
jihad.  Ironically, although the Egyptian government initially banned the publication of 
The Neglected Duty, the Sheikh of Al Azhar, Jadd al Haqq Ali Jadd al Haqq, probably the 
most respected religious scholar in Sunni Islam, published an official point by point 
refutation of Faraj’s arguments.  This refutation was widely published, including in the 
Cairo newspaper, Al Ahrar, which had the unintended consequence of also widely 
disseminating the initial material banned by Faraj himself.100   
While there are similarities between the Shia and Sunni renaissance, there are 
important differences as well, which help to illuminate the causes of the current 
discrepancies between the use of martyrdom operations by Shia and Sunni Muslims.  
First, the Shia revival was led primarily by classically trained ulama, not just ordinary 
clerics or other unsophisticated scholars, but ulama from the best Shia legal tradition and 
theological education.  Sunni leaders of the renaissance tended to be non-clerics, 
sometimes with only a secular university education or no advanced education at all.  The 
leaders of the traditional Sunni ulama typically align themselves with their respective 
governments and depend on them for financial support, unlike Shia ulama who collect a 
zakat (religious tax) directly from their congregations and pay their salaries from that pot 
of money.  Because of this, higher ranking Sunni scholars find it much more difficult to 
take positions contrary to their “infidel” governments, relegating the better trained and 
more qualified Sunni scholars outside of the main Sunni revival and renaissance.101 
Another difference between the renaissances in the two Islamic traditions was that 
the Shia had a spectacular success in the Islamic Revolution in Iran they could point to 
and draw on as the new ideology of aggressive jihad spread throughout the Shia world.102  
Hezbollah could also point to their success in convincing Western nations to remove their 
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forces from Beirut, and Israel to end its occupation of Southern Lebanon.  Amongst the 
Sunni Islamist attempts are mostly failures as seen with the FIS in Algeria, the Jami’at 
Islamiyya in Egypt, and the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan.  The combination of better 
qualified religious scholars leading the Shia revival and their subsequent successes is one 
reason why the Shia ulama have maintained a tighter control over the ideology that 
supports the use of suicide bombings as martyrdom operations.  When less qualified and 
disorganized individuals are fostering a renaissance, especially when the attempts at 
reform and revolution are met with failure, it is likely that you will see greater 
willingness to exceed the accepted norms of behavior and more innovation of ideas 
outside the mainstream.  This dynamic is precisely what happened within Sunni Islam 
with regards to contemporary martyrdom over the next twenty years, as we will see. 
Nawaf al-Takruri’s book, Martyrdom Operations in the Legal Balance was first 
published in 1997 during the al-Aqsa Intifada in the Palestinian territories, and represents 
the first mainstream Sunni justification for suicide bombing.  Although Takruri is writing 
in support of martyrdom operations as a tactic against Israel, his work seems to support a 
global jihadist perspective, making martyrdom operations seem like a panacea for 
Muslims everywhere.  It is not surprising, then, that in updated editions he adds Bosnia, 
Kashmir, Afghanistan and Iraq as examples where Muslims should feel a sense of pride 
for new martyrs.103 From Takruri: 
From this it was the decree of God during the difficult times in which the 
Muslims live, that the fruits of the Islamic Revival throughout the world 
are brought to their maturity, and that their bearers despite the hardship 
and lack of hope will carry the banner of defense of the honor of the 
community [umma], lifting the flag of jihad in order to liberate it from all 
manner of oppression.  The youth have volunteered with their blood 
without fleeing from life or responsibility, without grief or despair about 
the circumstances to which the community has fallen, but in belief that 
jihad is the only way to liberate lands and peoples.  So it is not strange that 
these youths who grew up at the table of the Quran, and believed that “he 
who overcomes after being wronged – upon those there is no reproach” 
(42:39) that they sacrifice in the way of raising the Word of God in the 
world and glorifying His religion and His servants.104   
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Takruri goes on to list the advantages of martyrdom operations: 
  
1)  They are a deterrent by means of causing terror among the enemy.  
2)  They cause the highest number of casualties on the part of the 
enemy with the fewest number of casualties on the part of the 
Muslims.  
3)  They equalize what would otherwise be unequal conflicts (such as 
that against Israel). 
4)  They cause the Israelis to think twice before perpetrating crimes 
against the Palestinians.  
5)  They cause happiness and fortitude to enter in the hearts of the 
Muslims, and despair to enter their enemies. 
6)  They give the Muslim community the spirit of jihad and 
martyrdom, and cause Muslims to focus upon fighters and martyrs 
as examples rather than other popular heroes or symbols.  
7)  They bring non-Muslims to the knowledge of what is Islam.105 
 
Martyrdom Operations in the Legal Balance gathered 29 fatwas (religious 
opinions of Islamic law) from all over the Arab-speaking Muslim world, which seem to 
support martyrdom operations.  By combining a wide swath of religious opinions, 
Takruri was able to show a semblance of consensus, a key element of Sunni Islam. 
However, since all of the fatwas condoning suicide attacks are in response to incursions 
into Muslim lands by Israel, the U.S., Russia, or India, it is not clear that these are not just 
political decrees masquerading as religious justifications.  Additionally, none of the 
classical Muslim fighters Takruri basis his justifications on actually committed suicide in 
battle; they merely continued to fight until they died at the hands of the enemy.106 Further 
analysis reveals that at least amongst the top governmental clergy, the Sunni ulama hoped 
that martyrdom operations could be confined to Palestine.107  It is possible that the fear of 
losing even more of their relevance to more radical Sunni elements, as well as the desire 
to support whatever the Palestinians were doing successfully to resist Israel, formed the 
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basis of the top-tier Sunni ulama’s condoning of suicide attacks as martyrdom operations.  
Unfortunately, this stance allows the more radical and less scholarly elements of Sunni 
Islam to justify using suicide attacks everywhere, despite the divisiveness of targeting 
non-combatants and Muslims.   
The argument that suicide bombers are not committing suicide was exemplified in 
works published online by Abu Qatada al-Falistini in 1995.  Qatada details two stories 
from the time of the prophet.  In the first, a Muslim falls forward onto his sword when he 
is unable to withstand the pain of a grave wound he received in battle.  The Prophet 
explained to his followers that the soldier was now in eternal hellfire, which was the 
punishment for anyone who commits suicide.  In the second story, after hearing tales of 
the benefits of martyrdom from the Prophet, some Muslims rushed off and plunged into 
the ranks of the enemy by themselves and were killed instantly.  These Muslims were 
considered devout and will be rewarded greatly in paradise.  The difference, Qutada 
argues, is the intention of the individual.  In the first example, the fighter is actively 
causing his own death in order to end his own suffering, which does not benefit anyone 
but himself – this is suicide.  In the second example, the fighter is sacrificing himself for 
the benefit of others – this is not suicide but glorious martyrdom.108 
Even more recent examples where martyrdom operations seem to be accepted as 
normative within Sunni scholars, at least with regard to their use in the Occupied 
Territories against Israel, are found in the works of Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi, a respected 
Sunni cleric based in Qatar with a television show on the Al Jazeera satellite channel.  
Qaradawi has issued several fatwas validating Palestinian self-annihilitory violence, 
claiming that the Occupied Territories are a special situation and, therefore, even suicide 
violence that kills civilians is not illegal under international law.  In addition to echoing 
previous distinctions between suicide and martyrdom operations, Qaradawi has also 
decreed that Muslim women in the Occupied Territories could also engage in martyrdom 
operations without the permission of their husbands or parents.109   
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While eventually what amounts to a consensus amongst Sunni ulama regarding 
martyrdom operations developed, it is noteworthy how long this process took.  The onset 
of suicidal attacks committed by Sunni organizations began in the 1990s in the Occupied 
Territories, but the more respected Sunni religious scholars were slow to come to a 
conclusion regarding the validity of such actions.  Some, like Sheikh Tantawi, the Grand 
Sheikh of Al Azhar Mosque in Cairo, took close to a decade before issuing a final ruling.  
Additionally, there are still many disagreements on exactly where and when the tactic can 
be used amongst the Sunni ulama.  Finally, respected Sunni ulama almost universally 
condemn Jihadi-Salafists like Al Qaeda who deliberately target civilians and other 
Muslims.  This delay and disagreement is in stark contrast to the Shia scholars who 
approved of the tactic prior to it being used by Hezbollah, were intimately involved with 
targeting decisions while it was being used, and were instrumental in it falling out of 
favor.  Again, I contend that the unbroken historical significance of martyrdom within the 
Shia tradition, versus Sunni, and the more hierarchical and organized nature of the Shia 
ulama helps explain these discrepancies.           
Examples of how the Shia revival concerning jihad and martyrdom influenced the 
Sunni revival can be found in literature from the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), a Sunni 
Islamist organization that broke off from the Muslim Brotherhood in the late 1970s with 
the goal of the destruction of Israel and the sovereignty of Palestine.  PIJ developed close 
ties with Hezbollah after it was exiled from Gaza in 1987 and relocated to Lebanon; it has 
since relocated to Damascus, Syria.  Fathi al Shiqaqi, one of the founders of the PIJ, 
claimed in a book he wrote about Khomeini in 1997 that he had to resort to Shiite 
theology for fatwas that advocated rebellion against tyranny because he could not find 
such cases within the Sunni realm of jurisprudence.  More recently, in 2003, another 
leader of PIJ, Ramadhan Shellah, admitted that PIJ borrowed the idea of “martyrdom 
operations” from Hezbollah.110  In order to better understand the social and political 
context that informed this period of Sunni religious scholarship, we will review the  
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events that led to the onset of the two Palestinian Intifadas, which witnessed a significant 
expansion in the use of martyrdom operations by Sunni groups over what Shia 
organizations had previously employed.      
In December 1992, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin deported 415 Islamic 
activists from the West Bank and Gaza into southern Lebanon.  Because the Lebanese 
government wanted nothing to do with them, Hezbollah took them in, during which time 
the cross-pollination of resistance tactics against Israel, including self-martyrdom 
operations, occurred.111  When the activists were allowed back into the Palestinian 
Territories after the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords, Hamas and PIJ could not institute 
a widespread suicide bombing campaign to derail the peace process, without incurring 
the wrath of Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Authority.  In a brilliant propaganda move, 
Hamas and PIJ waited to tie their suicide attacks to specific “provocative” actions by 
Israel, such as the February 1994 massacre of 29 Muslim worshippers in the Ibrahimi 
Mosque by a Jewish settler.  The Palestinian Authority did not want to be seen as taking 
drastic measures against groups who were viewed as defending the Palestinian people, 
nor could they allow Hamas and PIJ to completely derail hope for a two-state solution.  
So, the Palestinian Authority worked hard to minimize suicide attacks, and was, arguably, 
effective from September 1993 until September 2000 when suicide attacks by Palestinian 
militants averaged less than four per year.112  Between 1993 and 1997 during the First 
Intifada, a total of 20 suicide bombing attacks in Israel and the Occupied Territories 
claimed the lives of 154 people (excluding 21 suicide bombers) and injured 928 
others.113  Also worth noting was the overwhelming opposition to suicide bombings 
amongst the Palestinian population from March 1996 until March 1999.  Popular opinion 
polls showed opposition to suicide bombings at 55–70 percent during that period.114   
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During the Second Intifada, however, a new even more lethal round of suicide 
bombings began in October 2000.  By July 2005, suicide bombings had killed 549 people 
(excluding 148 suicide bombers), and injured 3,682 others.  As evidence of just how 
lethal the suicide attacks were in the beginning of the Second Intifada, the Israel Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs reports that almost 44 percent of Israeli casualties from September 
2000 until August 2002 were a result of suicide attacks, which composed only 1 percent 
of the total number of attacks by Palestinians.115  Besides the increase in frequency (at 
one point suicide bombings averaged one per day), the number of organizations 
conducting suicide bombings (four different organizations up from two in the first 
intifada) and the duration of the suicide bombing campaign, the Second Intifada was 
distinct from the First in the level of popular support for the tactic amongst the 
Palestinian population.  During the First Intifada, popular support for suicide bombing 
never exceeded 30 percent, but at the height of the Second Intifada, popular support 
exceeded 70 percent, and did so within just two months of the start of the uprising.116 
One does not have to look very hard to find reasons Palestinians would want to 
resort to violence to strike back at Israel.  By the year 2000, Palestinians had witnessed 
over 50 years of occupation of their homeland by Israel, the continued expansion of 
Israeli settlements onto lands they felt were promised them for a future Palestinian state, 
and the continued failure of their leaders to deliver on promises of independence.  With 
the failure of the negotiations at Camp David between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak 
and Palestinian Authority President Yassir Arafat in July 2000, the Occupied Territories 
were ripe for another uprising.  
Palestinians held large demonstrations on September 29, 2000 in reaction to Ariel 
Sharon’s visit with over 1,000 police officers to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount in 
Jerusalem the day before.  Haram al-Sharif is the third holiest site in Islam, the place 
where the Prophet Muhammad is believed to have ascended to heaven.  When Israeli 
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police used live ammunition in addition to rubber-coated bullets to disperse the crowd 
that was throwing stones at police in the vicinity of the Western Wall,  4 Palestinians 
were killed and 200 were injured, a stark contrast to the 14 Israeli policemen who were 
only injured.117 This new round of Palestinian bloodshed after the failure of the Camp 
David II talks provided the spark required to ignite the Second Intifada.  The lethal force 
used by Israeli forces during the initial days of the intifada was seen as excessive and as 
contempt for the lives and safety of Palestinians.  This perceived contempt was 
highlighted and reinforced by images of twelve-year-old Muhammad al Durra being shot 
as he huddled behind his father in Gaza on September 30, 2000.118 
A study of individual motivations of Palestinian suicide bombers during the 
Second Intifada shows that revenge and retaliation were key factors.  Sixty-nine of 101 
suicide bombings analyzed were determined to be reactive attacks to avenge the killing of 
a relative or as retaliation for a specific Israeli attack against the Palestinians.119  The 
other 32 bombers analyzed in Brym’s study showed that 27 were primarily religiously 
motivated, and 5 were to regain reputation.  It is worth noting that while revenge is a key 
factor for the majority of suicide bombers, it is seldom the sole reason or openly 
admitted, as the desire for revenge is technically against the rules for an individual 
seeking martyrdom.120   
Analysis by Eyad El-Sarraj revealed that the suicide bombers in the Second 
Intifada were children traumatized during the First Intifada, still suffering from 
humiliation, defeat and despair.121  It is only through an act of redemption like dying for 
their country as a martyr that they feel they can gain self-respect.  The redemptive logic 
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of suicide bombing can be found in the persistent themes in the last will and testaments of 
suicide bombers.  These themes include: martyrdom operations are necessary to satisfy a 
commitment to God; the bomber will be redeemed by selection for martyrdom as this 
generates approval from family and society; and the desire for rewards promised in the 
afterlife.122  While the accuracy of whether Islamic texts actually promise sexual benefits 
for martyrs in heaven is disputed by some religious scholars, organizations that employ 
suicide bombers promote this belief, and more importantly, the bombers themselves 
believe it.  One bomber who failed to detonate himself was found to have wrapped his 
genitals in toilet paper, wanting to protect them from the blast for the pleasures promised 
in the Garden of Eden.123  
Whether it is a psychological reaction to harsh state repression, a desire for 
revenge for the death of a loved one, or a sincere belief that they are fulfilling their 
religious duty, the cultural frame of “martyrdom operations” provides a vehicle for 
organizations to use individuals as weapons to pursue their goals.  To that end, 
organizations like Hamas and PIJ constantly cultivate a “culture of martyrdom,” to ensure 
a ready supply of bombers when engaged in suicide bombing campaigns.   
A common misperception about organizations that employ suicide bombers, 
however, is that they brainwash individuals into becoming suicide bombers – this is 
certainly not the case amongst the Palestinians.  Recruiters for Islamic organizations like 
Hamas only have to identify the predisposition of someone willing to die for the cause, 
and then reinforce that predisposition by exploiting religious beliefs to solidify sacrificial 
motives that already exist.124  Organizations provide the necessary resources for 
mounting a campaign of suicide bombing, specifically during the recruitment stage, and 
the planning and execution of a suicide attack.  Individuals acting alone will most likely 
not have the ability to procure the necessary components for a suicide bomb, the 
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technical know-how to create a successful device, the intelligence-gathering capability to 
plan an attack, or the logistical resources for effective execution.125  While there may be 
rare instances of individuals acting on their own committing suicide attacks, they 
obviously would find it difficult to mount a suicide bombing campaign on their own, 
especially if their first attack is successful.  
During the height of the Second Intifada, the Palestinian population became so 
mobilized and supportive of the suicide bombers that there were too many volunteers for 
martyrdom operations and organizations had to turn people away.  This extreme 
radicalization of the population also led to very short training phases, sometimes with 
only a few days’ turn-around between when a volunteer signed up and when they 
executed the attack.  Normally, there is a longer period of cleansing and purification 
during training.  A candidate will receive religious indoctrination, watch anti-Israeli 
propaganda, go on lengthy fasts, pay off all his debts, ask for forgiveness for all his sins 
in nightly prayers, and finally record a last will and testament statement.126  The making 
of a video fulfills multiple purposes: it gives the martyr a chance to say farewell to his 
loved ones, explains his motivations, and provides a powerful incentive for the bomber to 
carry through on his attack, as changing his mind will be seen as a shameful betrayal to 
his faith, family and nation.  The desired result of the training process is a bomber with 
the moral, political and religious justification needed to successfully execute his attack on 
behalf of the organization. 
Why organizations employ suicide attacks is another matter.  In the case of the 
Palestinian groups that resort to this tactic, they cite the effectiveness of the tactic in 
relation to other forms of resistance.127  Palestinian factions have little chance of standing 
up directly to the Israeli forces with its vastly superior firepower and resources.  
However, they believe that by going after soft targets, like the Israeli populace, they can 
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achieve a strategic “balance of terror.”  Hamas published in their London-based journal, 
Falastin al-Muslima (Islamic Palestine) articles that suicide bombing campaigns 
decreased the rate of Israeli settlements, decreased tourism hurting the Israeli economy, 
and increased the rate of desertion amongst the Israeli military as soldiers refused to serve 
in the territories.128  Other claims made by radical organizations are that since 
negotiations have yet to produce an Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian lands, suicide 
bombings are a preferred military tactic that works.  These organizations cite how 
Hezbollah successfully used the tactic to drive Israel out of Southern Lebanon, and how 
Hamas has successfully derailed the peace process they are opposed to multiple times, by 
employing suicide bombings.  To further understand organizational motives, it is useful 
to analyze in depth one of the first organizations to resort to suicide bombings in the 
Occupied Territories, the organization responsible for the largest number of suicide 
attacks in the territories, and the current de facto government in the Gaza Strip — Hamas. 
1. Hamas 
The Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, (Islamic Resistance Movement) better 
known by its acronym Hamas, was founded in 1987 during the First Intifada as the new 
underground wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip.  The founding members 
of Hamas felt it was necessary to rebrand the organization as distinct from the Muslim 
Brotherhood because the Muslim Brotherhood had been corrupted by western 
ideologies.129 As an Islamist organization, Hamas hoped to increase its political power by 
aligning its ideology as a contrast to the secular nationalist Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO).  Hamas argues that Palestine can only be liberated through Islamic 
ideology that can fully mobilize the people, not under human-derived banners. By 
attempting to reframe their resistance movement as a religious war between Islam and 
Judaism, Hamas benefits from increased support from like-minded Muslims, both within 
the Occupied Territories and internationally.    
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One of the major differences between the Hamas and the PLO was in how the 
PLO made a clear distinction between Jews and Zionists, arguing that the Palestinians are 
only fighting the forces of Zionism that are stealing Palestinian lands, not Jews in 
general.  Hamas redefines the Israeli-Palestinian dispute as part of the broader struggle 
between the West and Islam, dating all the way back to the Crusades and through 
Imperial times.  Hamas literature describes the struggle as an “existential battle and not 
just a question of borders.”130  Continuing the religious war theme, one of Hamas’ 
founders, Ibrahim Quqa, goes so far as to frame Israel’s poor treatment of the Palestinians 
as revenge for Muhammad’s victories over the Jewish tribes in Medina.  Hamas literature 
is also typically very racist in nature, as it groups all Jews together and describes them as 
“the bloodsucker of mankind,” “racists” and “criminals.”131 
Another difference between the current Palestinian Authority and Hamas is in 
how they articulate their goals.  Hamas avoids some criticism of failure because it has 
never articulated a short term strategy or goals, arguing the conflict should be viewed not 
in years, but in decades; that the road to victory is long, but its outcome has been 
predetermined by God.  For the Palestinians to succeed, it requires a devotion to Islam, 
following the right path, and forbearance.132  Hamas points to the decline of the Soviet 
Union as an example of a mighty power that eventually crumbled after decades. 
Unlike the Palestinian Authority, Hamas also maintains that all of Palestine is a 
sacred waqf (religious endowment) from God, and no one on earth can negotiate parts of 
it away.  This has led to the oft-publicized stance Hamas holds that the existence of the 
state of Israel is sacrilege and must be eliminated as a state.  Hamas’ official position is 
that the Jews currently there would be able to remain in the new Palestinian Islamic state 
and will even enjoy cultural and religious autonomy as they did historically under Islamic 
law.133   Since Israeli Jews are not likely to agree to this, Hamas is content to fight a holy 
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war until final victory.  Some scholars point out that, realistically, Hamas would have to 
accept a two-state solution based on U.N. resolutions 242 and 338 because of popular 
pressure, but Hamas argues that negotiations will never lead to that goal so they are not 
concerned about that possibility.134  Based on the historic failure of peace talks and the 
continued expansion of Israeli settlements on lands the Palestinians are expecting to 
become part of their state, it is hard to criticize Hamas’ negative assessment.  As such, 
Hamas’ mantra states that “Wherever a military occupation exists, a military resistance 
should be expected and exercised.  Such a resistance, taking various forms, would only 
stop when the occupation ends.”135  The most celebrated and, depending on your point of 
view, “effective” form of resistance Hamas has found, so far, is the suicide bomber.   
When analyzing why Palestinian organizations utilize suicide bombers, some 
noteworthy distinctions are apparent.  First of all, in the First Intifada, only the Islamist 
organizations PIJ and Hamas utilized suicide bombing: no secular organizations did.  
During the Second Intifada, while eventually the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade division of 
secular Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine both utilized suicide 
bombers, it was only after a distinct delay behind Islamist Hamas and PIJ.  In fact, the 
Popular Front did not resort to suicide bombing until October 2001, two months after 
assassination of its leader.  In the end, the Popular Front only accounted for 2 percent of 
the total suicide bombing attacks during the Second Intifada, compared to 44 percent for 
Hamas, 32 percent for Fatah, and 22 percent for PIJ.136  For its part, the top leadership of 
Fatah claims it did not plan on utilizing suicide bombers during the Second Intifada at all.  
Interviews with Fatah leadership revealed that the decision to begin suicide bombing was 
made “from below” by local leaders in response to Israel’s harsh repression tactics and 
the popular support for the martyrdom campaigns being waged by Hamas and PIJ.137  It 
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is only natural that suicide bombing is not openly promoted by secular organizations, as 
they have a more difficult time credibly tapping into the religious nature of martyrdom 
operations.  Hamas, on the other hand, is able to release leaflets that claim: 
Every day the earth absorbs the blood of the righteous, [and] kneels in 
front of the graves and bows before the martyrs of grace.  This is part of 
the price of pride and honor, liberation and salvation.  This is the dowry of 
those with lovely eyes [the houris], a substitute for paradise. “Behold! 
God had brought from the believers their lives and their wealth in return 
for Paradise…” [Quran 9:111]138 
Another development that helped Islamist organizations in portraying jihad as the 
correct way to fight Israeli expansion was the distinct change in how Israel was portrayed 
(weak) before the 1967 war, and how it was portrayed after its stunning victory (almost 
all-powerful).  Radical Islamist organizations like Hamas even believe there is a Jewish 
conspiracy to take over the world as portrayed in The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.  
Even though The Protocols was revealed long ago to be a Russian anti-Semitic forgery, 
the fact that many Islamists still believe it explains why they argue they are in an 
existential battle with Israel.139  
Although Hamas is an Islamist organization, among its leadership the decision to 
engage in a suicide bombing campaign is seen as a strategic decision rather than 
religiously motivated.  One study found that the timing and execution of the majority of 
the suicide attacks committed by Hamas over the years to be based on political factors, 
specifically to spoil any progress in the peace process.140  Another study specifically 
focused on the Second Intifada found the timing of the suicide attacks were a response to 
harsh Israeli tactics 82 percent of the time.141  A good example of this response dynamic 
is from June 2003, when Egypt, under strong American pressure, successfully got Hamas 
and PIJ to declare a three-month hudna (temporary cease-fire), with corresponding 
                                                 
138  Cook, Martyrdom in Islam, 144. 
139  Ibid., 137. 
140  Bloom, Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding, 62. 
141  Brym and Araj, Suicide Bombing as Strategy and Interaction: The Case of the Second Intifada, 
1978. 
 60
requirements on Israel to stop attacking the Palestinian people, lift the siege on 
Palestinian towns, and release Palestinian prisoners.  While Hamas and PIJ were 
honoring the hudna with no suicide attacks for 7 weeks, Israel ignored the temporary 
cease-fire, considering it an internal Palestinian matter, and mounted a large arrest and 
assassination campaign against Hamas during that time.  Ironically, on 7 August 2003, 
Israeli helicopters assassinated Isma’il Abu Shanab, a moderate voice within Hamas and 
the “engineer” of the hudna.142  Hamas immediately resumed martyrdom operations and 
the cycle of death in the Second Intifada continued.  This cycle resulted in such a high 
death toll, fear and anger amongst Palestinian civilians, that popular support for suicide 
bombing remained above 60 percent throughout the Second Intifada.143  This popular 
support for suicide bombings as a reaction to Israeli tactics provided organizations like 
Hamas a key structural factor they needed to promote a culture of martyrdom.  
While organizations like Hamas attempt to exploit cultural frames, the frames 
have to already exist in order for the message of organizations using them to be received 
and internalized by a target population.  An analysis of existing cultural frames that 
venerate martyrs within Islam, and by extension within the Palestinian territories, is 
necessary to understand why Sheikh Abdul Aziz Rantisi, the second highest ranking (and 
briefly the highest ranking Hamas leader until he was assassinated by Israel in April 
2004), would claim “For Hamas, and Palestinian society in general, becoming a martyr is 
among the highest, if not the highest, honor.”144 
In order to understand the general acceptance of suicidal violence amongst the 
Palestinians, one has to recognize the Islamic revival within Muslim societies that began 
in the 1970s.  Once pan-Arab nationalism was essentially discredited as a secular 
ideology with the disastrous Arab showing in the 1967 war with Israel, Islamist 
organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood stepped in to fill the vacuum with their 
message that the current sad state of the Arab world was due to the lack of piety amongst 
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the umma (Muslim community).  The Islamic Revolution in Iran and the defeat of the 
Soviet Union in Afghanistan gave credence to this growing Islamist movement, leading 
to increased mosque attendance, the spread of Islamist networks at universities, and 
ultimately Islamist political parties.145  Additionally, Islamist movements like Hamas 
have successfully delivered medical care, dentistry and other social services otherwise 
unavailable to the Palestinians under occupation.146  The overall success of Islamist 
movements allowed religious appeals to receive greater acceptance, and religious 
symbolism to resonate louder within Muslim populations.  This newfound religiosity is 
exemplified in the typical Quranic verses found in the last will and testaments of suicide 
bombers:  
2:154 – And call not those who are slain in the way of Allah “dead.” Nay, 
they are living, only ye perceive not.  
4:69 – Whoso obeyeth Allah and the messenger, they are with those unto 
whom Allah hath shown favor, of the Prophets and the saints and the 
martyrs and the righteous. The best of company are they!  
9:14 – Fight them; Allah will chastise them at your hands and bring them 
to disgrace, and assist you against them and relieve the hearts of a 
believing people.                   
These Quranic texts are emblematic of the larger narrative of martyrdom that 
Islamist organizations cultivate, where suicide bombers reflect the heroic struggle of the 
Prophet Muhammad who prevailed against overwhelming odds against the enemies of 
the early Islamic community.147  Supplementing the very popular martyrdom videos are 
posters everywhere venerating the bombers as heroes, and even digitally-altered pictures 
of Palestinian children killed by Israeli attacks holding rifles.148  A selective version of 
the role of martyrs in Islamic history and their rewards are published in periodicals by 
Islamist organizations. Benefits guaranteed to the shahid (martyr) include: 1) instant 
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forgiveness for all their sins, 2) a seat in Heaven, 3) a trophy of faith, 4) marriage to 72 
beauties, 5) a crown with priceless jewels, and 6) the ability to intercede and erase the 
sins of 70 relatives on judgment day.149  Even the parents of the bombers appear happy 
and proud in televised interviews when told their child has just blown themselves up and 
killed others.150    
Normally, one would expect voices of authority to combat this veneration of 
suicide bombers as heroes, but instead the Palestinian Authority and some prominent 
Muslim religious scholars were complicit in a number of ways.  Official news reports 
were obviously one-sided in their depictions of the daily killings, with every Israeli attack 
depicted as a massacre with scenes of Palestinian youths being killed to a background of 
dramatic music with nationalist lyrics.  Notable religious figures such as Sheikh ‘Akrama 
Sabri, Chief Mufti of Jerusalem; Sheikh Ahmed al-Tayyeb, Mufti of Egypt, and the 
aforementioned Sheikh Yussuf al-Qaradawi, all confirmed the right of Palestinians to 
conduct “martyrdom operations” against Israelis.151  With the failure of both the 
governmental and religious authorities to even attempt to combat the messaging of 
suicide bombing as heroic martyrdom, Islamist groups like Hamas were highly successful 
in establishing a new cultural frame.  Without this new cultural frame, Palestinian 
militants would not have been able to mainstream the acceptance of “martyrdom 
operations,” nor generate the numbers of volunteers necessary for the massive scale of 
the suicide bombing campaign conducted from 2000–2005.  Sadly, as massive as the 
suicide bombing campaign of the Second Intifada was at the time, it pales in comparison 
to the suicide bombing campaign unleashed by Global Salafi-Jihadist organizations like 
Al Qaeda in Iraq since 2003.  
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2.  Al Qaeda in Iraq 
In the 1990s, Hamas and PIJ used suicide bombers on 28 occasions against Israeli 
targets.152 During the Second Intifada, from October 2000 through February 2005, 116 
suicide attacks took place.153  However, from March 2003 through August 2006, there 
were 514 suicide attacks in Iraq, more than all the previous insurgent groups combined, 
including Hezbollah, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and Hamas in Israel.154 While it is 
not known definitively who is committing the majority of the suicide attacks in Iraq (58 
percent are unclaimed), of the suicide attacks that were claimed from 2003 through 2006, 
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) claimed responsibility for 71 percent (30 percent of the total).  
Ansar al-Sunna and miscellaneous Baathist organizations claimed responsibility for 10 
percent of the remaining (5 percent each) and the remaining two percent was divided 
among Ansar al-Islam and miscellaneous other.155 What stands as a remarkable 
development in Iraq, however, is that the vast majority of the targets of suicide bombings 
in Iraq are Iraqi security forces and Shia civilians, not coalition forces. Additionally, the 
bombers are mainly non-Iraqis, but are from Saudi Arabia, Europe, Syria, Kuwait, Jordan 
and North Africa.  Most of these can be described as “second generation” jihadists who 
trained in Afghanistan in the 1990s or fled their home countries to avoid being 
arrested.156   
Because of the difference from the Hezbollah and Hamas suicide bombing 
campaigns discussed previously, it is important to discuss reasons why the majority of 
suicide bombings go unclaimed in Iraq.  First of all, because the attacks are targeting 
Iraqi civilians, they are immensely unpopular, even amongst the Sunni population that 
has grievances against the Shia majority. With the majority of suicide attacks targeting 
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civilians, they are also perceived as religiously unjustifiable, so the bombers are not 
venerated as martyrs by the general populace.  Second, because the majority of 
martyrdom operations are being committed by foreign jihadists, they are even less likely 
to be received by Iraqis as supporting their interests and the jihadist organizations do not 
want to unnecessarily reveal their international networks of support.  In the rare cases 
where an Iraqi commits the attack, it makes sense that their identity is not revealed, so as 
to avoid retribution from the Shia or Kurdish population.157  The combination of the 
unpopularity of the targeting of civilians, combined with the anonymity of the bombers 
themselves, ensures that a culture of martyrdom that developed in the occupied territories 
is unlikely to develop in Iraq.  The fact that AQI does not even bother to release the 
martyrology propaganda that so permeated the Palestinian society during the second 
intifada is also an indication that they know, themselves, they are on thin theological ice.          
Jihadi Salafist organizations like AQI are aggressively using suicide bombings 
against the Shia majority that is currently in power, pursuing a strategy of “system 
collapse.” Essentially AQI is using suicide attacks to incite a sectarian civil war that will 
cause the tenuous new government to completely fail, at which point they can replace it 
with an Islamic emirate based on Sunni dominance similar to the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan. While the Baathists want their previous political power back from the Shia, 
Salafis refuse to live under what they consider to be heretical Shia rule.  Jihadi Salafis are 
distinct from the Islamic and nationalist insurgents in Iraq in their ideological emphasis.  
Although they all share the common goals of expelling the foreign forces from Iraq, the 
Islamic and nationalist insurgents view the war in Iraq as a defensive war against foreign 
invaders who are responsible for dividing Iraq along sectarian lines and handing power 
over to Iranian-backed Shia and U.S.-backed Kurdish factions in an effort to plunder 
Iraq’s oil wealth.158  
Jihadi Salafists groups, which are mostly composed of foreigners, hope to 
establish a new powerbase in Iraq from where they can wage international jihad.  Iraq is 
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viewed as a potential new safe haven and center of gravity, a replacement for 
Afghanistan, which they lost when the Taliban regime fell.159 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi 
repeatedly stated in a fifty-minute video montage by Al Qaeda that “We are not fighting 
for illusionary borders drawn by Sykes-Picot.  Nor are we fighting to replace a Western 
tyrant with an Arab tyrant.  Our jihad is more honorable than that.  We fight to raise 
God’s word on earth.”160 In another quote by Zarqawi from an internal Al Qaeda report, 
he is critical of other insurgent groups that are not employing martyrdom operations: 
We have told them in our many sessions with them that safety and victory 
are incompatible, the tree of triumph and empowerment cannot grow tall 
and lofty without blood and defiance of death…People cannot awaken 
from their stupor unless talk of martyrdom and martyrs fills their days and 
nights.   
What is revealing in this passage is that the foreign jihadists are working to convince 
their Iraqi brothers that they need to adopt the tactics of martyrdom.  This is further 
evidence that suicide attacks were not an indigenous development of Iraqi insurgents, but 
rather an imported tactic based on a foreign ideology.161 Jihadi Salafi ideology strongly 
emphasizes martyrdom, which when combined with malignant anti-Shia rhetoric, allows 
them to dehumanize and de-Muslimize their target sets through the practice of takfir 
(excommunication), thereby justifying the killing of large numbers of civilians and 
Muslims.162  However, this ideology is hypocritical, because while the Jihadi Salafists 
care about the intentions of the bomber blowing himself up as a reason he is not 
committing suicide, they care only about the actions of their targets and not their target’s 
intentions when justifying the killing of Muslims and civilians.163 
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The vast majority of Muslims, however, reject the whole practice of takfir, and 
scholars point out several hadith attributed to the prophet that explain that if a Muslim 
wrongly declares a fellow Muslim a kufr (infidel), he himself becomes a kufr. Even 
among Salafis there is disagreement on the practice of takfir.  Some less radical argue 
that a Muslim ruler can only be declared an infidel if he institutes policies he knows to be 
against Islam and declares their superiority to God’s laws.  Others argue that to be 
excommunicated, one must justify his sins in public, or at a minimum, be given the 
opportunity to repent.164  
Perhaps the most complex justification that modern Salafists use to justify killing 
other Muslims and civilians involves a historic ruling of Islamic scholars regarding the 
killing of human shields.  According to this tradition, it is permissible for Muslims to kill 
fellow Muslims if they are serving either willingly or unwillingly as human shields for 
invaders. AQI has manipulated this ruling with somewhat perverse logic to argue that 
coalition forces are essentially hiding behind civilians in public spaces and that if AQI 
were to stop the suicide bombings in order to prevent the death of civilians, the waging of 
jihad would end.  The end of jihad would harm the entire ‘collective’ of the umma by 
allowing foreigners to control Muslim lands, exploit Muslim resources, and humiliate and 
persecute the entire Muslim nation.  When ordinary Muslims are killed by martyrdom 
operations, it only results in ‘private’ harm against the individuals, while the attacks bring 
‘collective’ benefit to the entire umma. Jihadi Salafists stretch the logic of this argument 
even further in order to justify the self-annihilation of suicide bombers.  If Muslims  
can inflict harm on other Muslims to benefit the entire community, then certainly  
it is permissible to kill themselves to benefit Islam.165   
The acceptance of targeting civilians by Salafi-Jihadists appears to be a recent 
phenomenon, as earlier proponents of violent Salafism, such as Wahhab and Sayyid Qutb 
never argued civilians could be targeted.  On the contrary, the Quran and Sunna contain 
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many verses that admonish the protection of the sanctity of life and the prohibition 
against targeting non-combatants in warfare.  Some radical Salafists disagree with their 
compatriots and argue there are strict rules that must be met before Muslims are allowed 
to kill fellow Muslims.  Abu Basir al-Tartusi points out specifically, regarding the human 
shields rule, that there are four conditions that must be met before Muslims are allowed to 
kill other Muslims: 1) it must be impossible to fight the aggressor another way; 2) it must 
be clear that avoiding harm to the human shields would result in greater harm to 
Muslims; 3) the benefit from killing human shields must be absolutely clear, not just a 
possibility or probability; and 4) if the previous conditions are met, it is permissible to 
attack the enemy being shielded by the other Muslims, but the intent must be to attack the 
enemy, not the human shields.166    
 Another way Salafi-Jihadists have lowered the bar on who can be targeted 
involves lowering the standard on what constitutes a supporter of the enemy.  Because 
Western countries are typically democracies that elect their leaders who make decisions 
to go to war, the entire population of the country becomes valid targets.  Bin Laden said, 
“War is a common responsibility among people and governments…The war is continuing 
and the people are renewing their loyalty to their rulers and politicians and sending their 
sons to the armies to fight us.  They also continue their material and moral support, while 
our countries are burning, our homes are being bombed, and our people are being 
killed.”167  
 Sometimes Salafi-Jihadists justify killing civilians by simply arguing that these 
civilians will someday harm Muslims.  This logic was first used when Palestinian 
militants justified killing Israeli children; they argued that killing the children was 
justified, since they would someday grow up and join the Israeli Defense Forces where 
they would kill Muslims.  Finally, sometimes Salafi-Jihadists will not even bother to find 
religious justifications for killing Muslims and civilians, arguing instead that the end 
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justifies the means.  According to Zarqawi, “the shedding of Muslim blood…is allowed 
in order to avoid the greater evil of disrupting jihad.”168  In these weakly-justified cases, 
the jihadists will emphasize that if the Muslims who were killed were innocent, they 
became martyrs and are already in heaven.169  Suleiman Abu Gheith, a Kuwaiti Islamist 
who is considered one of Al Qaeda’s official spokesmen, when referring to the 9/11 
hijackers, declared that “those youths that destroyed Americans with their planes, they 
did a good deed.  There are thousands more young followers who look forward to death 
like Americans look forward to living.” 170 
This rapid evolution of extremist Sunni ideology led Wiktorowicz to conclude 
that groups such as Al Qaeda have “broken new ground over the past decade or so to 
develop an expanded understanding about permissible targets in war.”171 The ideology of 
Al Qaeda and their justifications for targeting civilians and Muslims are also rejected by 
the very Shia scholars that originally pioneered the modernization of jihad and 
martyrdom operations.  For example, Ayatollah Fadlallah denounced the September 11, 
2001 attacks as “criminal-suicidal acts that constitute an ugly human genocide in all 
respects…these were not martyrdom acts…neither offensive nor defensive jihad justifies 
such acts that are denounced religiously.”172    
While there is some disagreement among Jihadi-Salafists on the implementation 
of martyrdom operations, there is a consensus that suicide missions are the ultimate sign 
of devotion to God. Jihadi-Salafists also acknowledge that they base the use of this tactic 
on the earlier legitimacy that religious scholars granted to its use against Israel.  With so 
many scholars validating martyrdom operations against Israelis, the voices of the ulama 
who deplored suicide attacks, were marginalized and drowned out.  Ironically, it was this 
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failure to condemn the targeting of Israeli civilians that eventually led to the justifications 
for targeting Muslim civilians that we see in Iraq and other locales.  It is also telling that 
Salafi-Jihadists care little about crafting theological justifications for suicide missions.  
Instead their writings and speeches focus almost exclusively on the virtues of martyrdom, 
a separate subject that engenders little debate and enjoys broad consensus amongst 
Islamic scholars.173 Sunni scholars are also not as troubled as the Shia clerics were by the 
fact the bomber is killed in the attack; they accept the distinction between suicide from 
despair and suicide from jihad as being normatively different.  They also do not attach a 
threshold for the death of the individual like Fadlallah did, that it must “convulse the 
enemy” and be worthy of the sacrifice of the individual.  This is yet another indication 
that the Sunni extremists who employ suicide attacks know they are on shaky ideological 
ground and do not possess the scholarly credentials necessary to make the proper 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Martyrdom, in summary, in our culture, contrary to other schools where it 
is considered to be an accident, an involvement, a death imposed upon a 
hero, a tragedy, is a grade, a level, a rank.  It is not a means but it is a 
goal itself.  It is originality.  It is a completion.  It is a lift.  It itself is mid-
way to the highest peak of humanity, and it is a culture. – Ali Shari’ati 
 
Prior to 1994, martyrdom operations were almost exclusively employed by 
Shiites, and only when their homeland was threatened.  This Shia exclusivity was 
understandable based on the 1,400-year historical tradition of martyrdom within Shia 
Islam.  However, since that time, almost the exact opposite has been true with Sunni 
radicals not only greatly expanding the number of suicide attacks, but expanding the 
target set for the attacks to include non-combatants and specifically targeting Muslims as 
well.  This shift occurred despite there being little historical basis for the veneration of 
martyrs in Sunni Islam since the Umayyad dynasty.  One of the primary reasons for this 
paradigmatic shift lies with the differences in the religious clergy between Sunni and Shia 
Islam and the relationship with their respective populations.  Where the hierarchal Shia 
ulama were able to restrain and then effectively end Hezbollah’s use of suicide attacks, 
once the results were deemed not to be worthy of the sacrifice of the martyr, the Sunni 
ulama are far too fragmented and fearful of becoming even less relevant in the face of 
growing Islamic revivalism.  Another reason for the difference seen in contemporary 
martyrdom operations is Sunni Islam’s lack of a contiguous historical tradition of 
martyrdom.  This lack of contiguous tradition has allowed radical Sunni elements to 
effectively rewrite their history concerning martyrdom, and create a culture of martyrdom 
to suit their contemporary political ambitions.  With a fragmented and impotent Sunni 
ulama at the highest levels of scholarship, radical Sunni Salafi-Jihadists have now 
expanded the target set of martyrdom operations to include not only innocents and 
civilians, but even other Muslims, all of which is forbidden by the Quran.  Unlike the 
Shia, the fact that Sunni groups, like Hamas, generate so much propaganda to quantify 
the rewards and glorify the act of their suicide bombers as martyrs can be seen as an 
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attempt to create new cultural frames that did not previously exist in the Sunni tradition.  
This Sunni propaganda was necessary in order to maintain the culture of martyrdom 
during the Palestinian Intifadas and to ensure a consistent societal framework from which 
to recruit future bombers.  Even more telling is the fact that groups like Al Qaeda in Iraq 
do not always claim their suicide attacks, or produce the martyr propaganda to justify 
their suicide bombings, recognizing that there is currently no cultural frame in the greater 
Muslim community through which the deliberate targeting of Muslims with martyrdom 
operations is acceptable.     
A. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
With the ending of Shia campaigns of suicide bombings in the 1980s, and with 
the virtual cessation of suicide attacks by Sunni Palestinian groups after the end of the 
Second Intifada in 2005, most suicide attacks being committed today are by terrorist 
groups that adhere to a radical Salafi-Jihadist ideology.  While there are many physical 
security countermeasures, intelligence gathering practices and offensive deterrent policies 
that a state can implement to try and reduce the frequency of attacks, or the effectiveness 
of suicide bombers, it would not be appropriate to delve into those policy questions as 
this research focused on the historical basis and the contemporary theological 
justifications used in martyrdom operations.    
However, it is here, in the realm of combating a faulty ideology that there may be 
a ray of hope.  The more recent tragedies caused by Sunni extremists targeting civilians 
and Muslims using over-extended and faulty religious justifications, have caused a 
backlash within the Muslim community. There is evidence based on the widespread 
rejection of the atrocities of 9/11, the suicide bombings committed by Al Qaeda in Iraq, 
and other indiscriminate suicide bombings by Sunni extremists around the globe that the 
wider Muslim world is beginning to rethink whether suicide attacks actually constitute 
martyrdom operations.  However, while it is in the United States’ interest to nurture this 
growing rejection of suicide violence, we cannot be seen as doing so to the Muslim 
world.  The reform of martyrdom ideology that supports indiscriminate killing must come 
from non-violent Salafists, Islamists and other moderate Muslims.  In fact, Western  
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nations must tread extremely carefully in this nurturing effort in order to prevent a 
moderate Muslim scholar or leader from being labeled a lackey of the infidel West and 
losing all his credibility.       
Along the lines of exposing the faulty ideology of martyrdom operations are a 
number of facts and themes moderate Muslims can highlight and promote: 1) Muslims 
are currently the primary victims of suicide attacks, so exactly how Muslims benefit from 
this is unclear; 2) extremists that kill fellow Muslims openly use the logic of “the ends 
justify the means,” which inherently cheapens the value of Muslim life; 3) the practice of 
takfir divides the Muslim community and risks a Muslim civil war; 4) suicide is 
forbidden in Islam and the Prophetic traditions that are used to provide exceptions to this 
prohibition are unconvincing and controversial, especially when combined with the body 
of evidence that individuals commit attacks for other than purely altruistic reasons; 5) 
there is growing evidence that some organizations that currently employ suicide 
bombings are exploiting young Muslims; 6) leaders of extremist organizations are 
hypocrites when they say martyrdom operations are the highest form of devotion one can 
show to God – if so, then why do the leaders never blow themselves up?; 7) many of the 
current advocates of suicide attacks lack the necessary religious training and authority to 
issue Islamic legal opinions; and 8) Salafi-Jihadists offer a bleak vision of the future, 
under strict sharia law, similar to what the Taliban imposed in Afghanistan – a future 
most Muslims reject.174 
 While exposing the inconsistencies, the hypocrisy, and the tortured logic of 
current Islamist ideology that promotes martyrdom operations will not end the 
phenomenon of suicide bombing on its own, it is an important step in delegitimizing the 
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